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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays investigating the determinants of civil 
conflict from the aspects of history, geography, and external assistance, respectively. 
Each of the essays uses empirical economic techniques to analyze how these factors 
affect the spatial and temporal distributions of modern conflict events. 
I explore the long-run effects of slave trade on conflict in Africa. By using a geo-
coded disaggregated dataset in sub-Saharan Africa and exploiting variation of slave trade 
intensity within countries, I find a robust positive relationship between slave exports 
from a region and current conflict prevalence. Evidence from an instrumental variable 
approach suggests that the relationship is causal. I then discuss the potential causal 
channels underlying the relationship, suggesting that slave trade is correlated with 
mistrust, local institution deterioration, and a weaker sense of national identity. 
I then examine how slave trade in history affects the relationship between 
weather shock and civil conflict. Exploiting weather variation during the growing season 
of the locally dominant crop, I find that adverse weather shock significantly increases 
the likelihood of conflict incidence, onset, and intensity. Furthermore, the effect of 
weather shock on the risk of civil conflict is substantially amplified by the exposure to 
slave trade. 
I also study the dynamic interdependences among foreign aid, development, and 
conflict. Although foreign aid is sensitively responsive to the conflict or development 
shock, its effects on reducing conflict and improving development are largely dependent 
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on the wealth level and conflict proneness of the recipient country. I find that foreign aid 
only mitigates conflict in middle income developing countries, but can enhance the 
development of the poor and conflict-prone countries. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
There has been a steady rise in the number of civil conflicts since the end of 
World War II. In any year over the last decade, 25-30 countries had an internal armed 
conflict. I also find a great coincidence that almost 80% of conflict-affected nations are 
the poorest countries. Since civil conflict is documented to be negatively related with 
economic development, it is portrayed as “development in reverse” (Collier, 2004), 
which described civil conflict and development as two sides of the same coin. 
What are the rooted causes of civil conflicts? Answers to this critical question 
have evolved over time.  
Since late 1990s, a group of researchers at the World Bank's “Economics of Civil 
War, Crime, and Violence" project, led by Paul Collier, have introduced econometrics 
models into the field of conflicts and development (Collier and Hoeffler; 1998, 2004). 
Together with a few other economists (for example, Fearon and Laitin, 2003), they have 
made great contributions towards finding the correlates of civil conflict. It is now well 
known that the occurrence of civil conflict is robustly linked to the economic conditions 
(income per capita, for example), ethnic fragmentation and polarization, population, 
natural resources, political institution, trade, as well as rough terrain. However, as 
Blattman and Miguel (2010) argued: “In many cases it is still not clear which of the 
above correlates actually cause war and which are merely symptoms of deeper 
problems.” 
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Later, the focus switched to the identification strategies based on exogenous 
variation in the economic conditions, in order to convincingly avoid endogeneity 
problem and identify causal relationships. Miguel et al. (2004) made the first attempt to 
use rainfall growth as an instrument to show the causal effect of economic shocks on 
civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). After their influential work, many subsequent 
conflict-related empirical studies began to explore the relationship between climate 
variability and conflict, finding the significant impact of weather on conflict in Africa, 
India, and China from past till now (Burke et al., 2009; Bai and Kung, 2011; Bohlken 
and Sergenti, 2010; Couttenier and Soubeyran, 2014). 
More recently, the attention has moved to the subnational- or disaggregated-level 
analysis since the country-level studies have inherent limitations. In national-level 
analysis, it is hard to precisely estimate the individual- and group-level conflict 
determinants, such as ethnic characteristics and regional resource endowments. In 
practice, the country-level framework is either split by administrative regions (Hodler 
and Raschky, 2014) or grid cells of 1 degree of latitude by 1 degree of longitude (Harari 
and La Ferrara, 2014). Furthermore, a burgeoning literature seeks to discover ever 
deeper causes of civil conflict rooted in history. Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) shown 
that the modern era violence is correlated with the historical conflict in Africa in the 
precolonial period between 1400 and 1700. Their research shed light on the importance 
of long-term effects that historic events can have on civil conflict. 
In Chapter II, we investigate the long-term effects of slave trade on civil conflict 
in Africa in the present days.   By using a geo-coded disaggregated dataset in sub-
 3 
 
Saharan Africa and exploiting variation of slave trade intensity within countries, we find 
a robust positive relationship between slave exports from a region and current conflict 
prevalence. Evidence from an instrumental variable approach suggests that the 
relationship is causal. We then discuss the potential causal channels underlying the 
relationship, suggesting that slave trade is correlated with mistrust, local institution 
deterioration, and a weaker sense of national identity. 
There are other possible "rooted causes" for civil conflict. For example, 
proponents of the geography view argue that weather variations may affect the 
likelihood of violence persistently and globally.  Chapter III examines the climate-war 
hypothesis and discusses the interaction between weather shock and exposure to the 
slave trade on civil conflict. Exploiting weather variation during the growing season of 
the locally dominant crop, we find that (i) adverse weather shock significantly increase 
the likelihood of conflict incidence, onset, and intensity; (ii) this effect of weather shock 
on the risk of civil conflict is substantially amplified by the exposure to slave trade. The 
interactive effect of weather shock and slave trade remain robust to the use of 
instrumental variable approach and extensive robustness checks. This chapter relates to 
the debates between the “geography matters” and the “history matters” views (Nunn, 
2009). Our interaction analysis suggests that both geographic and historic characteristics 
(in our study, weather shock and slave trade) can jointly affect the contemporaneous 
conflict. 
Given the historic and geographic conflict determinants mentioned above, it 
seems that the likelihoods of conflict events are largely a consequence of a country’s 
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own endowments. Collier uses the term “conflict trap” to describe a set of countries that 
are conflict prone. The importance of conflict trap is that conflict degrades the structural 
factors, such as infrastructure, commerce, education, and governance, which tends to 
facilitate future conflict. Chapter IV examines whether foreign assistance could help the 
recipient countries emerge from conflict trap and poverty. We find that foreign aid is 
sensitively responsive to the conflict or development shock. Furthermore, the effects of 
foreign aid on reducing conflict and improving development are largely dependent on 
the wealth level and conflict proneness of the recipient country: foreign aid only 
mitigates conflict in middle income developing countries, but can enhance the 
development of the poor and conflict-prone countries. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF SLAVE TRADE ON CIVIL CONFLICT                  
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Civil conflict is widely studied in the realm of African economic development 
because conflict prevalence is strikingly high in Africa. According to the Armed Conflict 
Database (ACD), an African country is 1.7 times more likely to have at least 1,000 
battle-related deaths per year than countries in the rest of the world over the last 60 
years. Within this continent that has fallen into the "conflict trap", most of the conflict 
events have broken out in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). For instance, 198 of 199 African 
civil wars1 that were recorded in the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project 
(ACLED) since 1997 occurred in SSA. These statistics illustrate the importance of 
understanding the causes of civil conflict in SSA. 
There is a large body of research in economics on the determinants of conflict. 
As shown by Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) among 
many others, income level, institution, and natural endowments are robustly related with 
the likelihood of civil conflict. By utilizing Murdock’s (1959, 1967) pre-colonial African 
ethnicity map and ethnicity level slave data from Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), we 
advance this literature by focusing on the following research question: Why do some 
                                                 
1 A civil war is conventionally defined as a civil conflict that causes more than 1,000 battle deaths. 
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ethnic homelands in SSA experience civil conflict (more frequently) while others do 
not? This chapter attempts to answer this question by studying the link between slave 
trade and contemporary civil conflict. 
A key concern in this paper is why slave trade that took place centuries ago 
would matter for present violence. On a broader scale, Nunn (2009) argues that past 
events can have long-run impacts by altering deep determinants of contemporary 
economic and political outcomes. As one of the most significant events in Africa’s 
history, slave trade can drastically affect some deep-rooted determinants, including 
domestic institutions and cultural norms of behavior. One of the most remarkable 
features of Africa’s slave trade is that slaves were commonly captured through wars, 
raids, and kidnappings. Historical accounts show that ethnicities raided other ethnicities, 
and villages raided other villages, no matter how close they had been; individuals were 
enslaved by acquaintances, friends, or even relatives and family members (Inikori, 2000; 
Nunn, 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). The resultant uncertainty and insecurity 
within and across communities created an atmosphere of hostility and mistrust among 
individuals, villages, and ethnicities, which in turn have had a bearing on the spatial 
distribution of civil conflict in SSA. Besides conflict, a growing set of literature 
(Acemoglou et al. 2005; Nuun, 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Dalton and Leung, 
2014) shows that slave trade could influence several other contemporary socio-economic 
outcomes. Details will be given in the following parts. 
We conduct empirical analysis at the ethnic level instead of country level for 
several reasons. First, country-level studies have inherent limitations, since the within-
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country heterogeneity may bias the estimates. Given that the range of civil conflict is 
usually less than one-quarter of a country's territory (Raleigh and Hegre, 2009), there 
might exist a possible mismatch between conflict and its driving factors in different 
regions within the same country. Second, the African countries acceded to independence 
only since 1956. Thus, the history of SSA countries as sovereign nations is 
comparatively short (at most 60 years). Moreover, even the contemporary African 
political boundaries were artificially drawn by European powers during the "Scramble 
for Africa" at the end of the 19th century, when in fact 843 ethnic groups had occupied 
the African continent for hundreds of years (Murdock, 1967). Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou (2013) provide ample evidence that ethnic-specific traits have long-lasting 
effects on today's local societies in Africa, although national borders have partitioned 
many ethnic groups. In other words, the chronicles of contemporary African nations are 
too short to cover the historical legacies of the tribal era, implying that disaggregating 
data at the ethnicity level makes sense when we study conflict in SSA. Third, we display 
the spatial discrepancy of civil conflict in SSA in either a present administrative map 
(left panel) or a historical ethnicity map (right panel) in figure 2.1. We use darker colors 
to indicate more conflict fatalities between 1997 and 2014. The ethnicity map appears to 
be better at capturing the spatial heterogeneity of civil conflict. It shows that some ethnic 
groups within a modern country are more prone to conflict than others. The graphical 
evidence that SSA civil conflict may be ethnically distributed again supports our 
argument: subnational study of Africa should be implemented at the ethnic level. 
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Figure 2.1 Civil Conflict Intensity in SSA by Country Borders and Ethnic Borders 
 
 
 
Our empirical investigation exploits cross-sectional variation from the numbers 
of slaves exported from SSA ethnic homelands during 1400-1900, and it uncovers a 
positive relationship between slave trade and modern conflict prevalence. The SSA 
ethnic homelands that are more prone to conflict today are those from which more slaves 
were exported through transatlantic and Indian Ocean trade routes. This relationship is 
robust to a battery of subnational controls ranging from geographic and location 
characteristics to historical ethnic-level factors. 
We further pursue the instrumental variable (IV) approach to examine whether 
this relationship is causal. As mentioned above, the procurement of slaves mainly 
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occurred through internal warfare, raids, and kidnapping, which could be viewed as 
types of historical civil conflict in Africa. Thus, it might be possible that ethnic 
homelands experience more conflict events today because those ethnic groups were 
initially susceptible to conflict. Motivated by Nunn’s (2008) study, we use the distances 
from each ethnic group to the locations where slaves were demanded as the instrumental 
variables for slave exports in order to address potential endogeneity. Unlike Nunn’s 
instruments, which are sailing distances at the country level, we constructed our own 
instruments at the ethnic level and include both overland distances and sailing distances. 
In addition, we only need two instruments for trans-Atlantic slave trade and Indian 
Ocean slave trade instead of all 4 slave trade routes, since our sample was little involved 
in the other two routes (the Red Sea and Saharan slave trades). Trade distances are 
plausible instruments for slave exports, since the location of slave demand is determined 
by exogenous natural endowments for producing particular commodities such as sugar 
and tobacco and, thus, not influenced by the location of slave supply. As such, this paper 
also relates to the empirical approaches recently taken by Becker and Woessmann 
(2009) and Rubin (2014), who also employ distance indicators as IVs to investigate the 
effects of a historic event. The IV approach makes it credible to assert that the 
correlation between slave trade and contemporary conflict is a causal relationship. The 
IV coefficients are positive and approximately 9 times greater than the OLS coefficients, 
suggesting that the OLS method tends to bias the effects of slave trade toward zero. 
We then perform several robustness checks regarding the IV regressions. First, 
we replace the outcome variable of conflict prevalence by a number of alternative 
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measures from different data sources. The result shows that the effects of slave trade 
hold regardless of how conflict prevalence is coded. Second, to mitigate concerns related 
to the exclusion restriction, we examine the reduced-form relationship between trade 
distances and conflict prevalence inside and outside of our SSA sample. Within our 
sample, the reduced-form relationship implies that ethnic homelands that are farther 
away from the location of slave demand are less prone to conflict. This is what we 
expect, since our SSA sample covers all areas that were largely involved in the trans-
Atlantic slave trade and Indian Ocean slave trade. If the exclusion restriction is satisfied, 
then the reduced-form relationship should be insignificant outside of our SSA sample. 
Otherwise, it suggests that the distance instruments do not affect conflict prevalence only 
through slave trade. We examine the areas within SSA but not in our sample, as well as 
all the rest of African areas outside of our sample, finding that the reduced-form 
relationships are indeed statistically insignificant outside of our sample. Third, we 
further relax the perfect exclusion restriction assumption and allow the instruments to 
have direct effects on the outcome variable in the second stage of IV regression. Using a 
Bayesian method introduced by Conley, Hansen, and Rossi (2012), we find that the 
direct effects of the instruments on conflict should be approximately two-thirds of the 
overall effects (direct effects and indirect effects of instruments) to render our IV results 
insignificant, which is very unlikely. 
Although the major contribution of this chapter is to empirically identify the 
causal relationship between slave trade and contemporary conflict, we also discuss the 
underlying mechanisms. We find that slave trade acts on conflict via both the wealth 
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level and cultural and institutional factors. These results provide evidence that the 
procurement and export of slaves give rise to mistrust among individuals, diminishing 
local governance and the formation of stronger ethnic identity rather than national 
identity, which in turn increases the likelihood of civil conflict incidence. 
The next section reviews the literature on the historic determinants of civil war 
and the role of slave trade on contemporary economic outcomes. We describe our data in 
section 2.3. In section 2.4, we document the correlation between slave trade and conflict 
and further discuss the causality issue in section 2.5. In section 2.6, we then turn to the 
discussion of potential channels of causality, with an emphasis on non-economic factors. 
Section 2.7 concludes. 
 
2.2 Existing Literature 
Blattman and Miguel (2010) have already provided a comprehensive review of 
the theoretical and empirical studies on civil conflict and summarized the oft-cited 
correlates of conflict. Thus, we do not attempt to go through these details but instead 
concentrate on the recent research about the deep-rooted determinants of conflict.  
Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) show that the violence of the modern era is 
correlated with historical conflict in Africa in the precolonial period between 1400 and 
1700. Arbatli et al. (2015) demonstrate that the degree of genetic diversity, determined 
during the prehistoric "out of Africa" migration, has significantly contributed to the 
distribution of civil conflict nowadays. Depetris-Chauvin (2015) finds that long 
historical exposure to statehood leads to less contemporary conflict through people's 
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attitudes toward national identity. Their research sheds light on the importance of 
historic events that can impact civil conflict. This paper adds to this literature by 
examining the effect of slave trade on the likelihood of present civil conflict in SSA. On 
a broader scale, our work relates to a strand of literature that documents how the deep-
rooted factors in Africa still play an important role in shaping modern African 
development. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012, 2013) note that the historical 
legacies, such as the “scramble for Africa” and pre-colonial political institution, are 
related to contemporary regional economic development. Others investigate the impacts 
on institution and culture, including Gennaioli and Rainer (2007), who find that African 
countries with more-centralized precolonial political institutions also sustain higher 
levels of government quality, and the recent study by Gershman (2016), which shows the 
effects of traditional witchcraft beliefs on trust and other measures of social capital. 
Moreover, this paper complements the burgeoning body of work on the long-run 
effects of slave trade. Acemoglu et al. (2005) argue that the rise of Western Europe after 
1500 is largely due to access to Atlantic trade, which of course consists of slave trade 
with Africa. Nunn (2008) provides an empirical analysis of the negative relationship 
between the scale of slave trade and contemporary economic development in African 
countries. Nunn and Wantchekon (2010) then find that people’s trust levels within 
Africa can be explained by slave trade. The long-term effects of slave trade on Africa's 
social structure are studied as well. Dalton and Leung (2014) document that males were 
disproportionately enslaved, which has led to prolonged abnormal sex ratios and high 
polygyny rates. 
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Finally, our IV approach enables us to overcome the endogeneity problem, 
adding to a large body of research that examines the underlying causes of civil conflict. 
There have been ample studies on the causes of temporal distribution of conflict events, 
beginning with Miguel et al. (2004), that use rainfall growth as an instrument to show 
the causal effect of economic shocks on civil conflict in SSA (e.g., Burke et al., 2009; 
Bai and Kung, 2011; Couttenier and Soubeyran, 2014). The core research question that 
these studies pursue is why conflict events wax and wane over time in the same 
ethnicity-country region. Unlike research in the temporal dimension, the endeavor of this 
paper is to explore the causality in the cross-sectional dimension, searching for the 
deeper time-invariant causes that make some ethnic homelands experience civil conflict 
more frequently while holding all else constant. 
 
2.3 Data 
Based on Murdock’s (1959) ethnolinguistic map, the starting step of constructing 
our dataset is to divide the SSA continent into irregular polygons that are shaped by both 
modern country and historic ethnicity borders, as shown in the right panel of figure 2.1. 
Researchers studying the link between weather shocks and conflict often disaggregate 
data into smaller pixels. We do not follow this approach, because the slave exports data 
are measured at the ethnic level. Furthermore, pixels that overlap more than one 
ethnicity may result in biased estimates. Our sample consists of 813 regions covering 
601 ethnic homelands and 28 SSA countries. We focus on the impacts of slave trade 
only through the transatlantic and Indian Ocean trade routes due to data limits. 
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Consequently, a few SSA countries are not included in the sample because they are 
significantly affected by slave trade through trans-Saharan and Red Sea trade routes. 
The main outcome variable is collected from the ACLED dataset (Raleigh et al., 
2010), which has been widely used in recent disaggregated conflict research (for 
example, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2011; Harari and Ferrara, 2013; Besley and 
Reynal-Querol 2014). ACLED records a range of civil conflict events in African states, 
including battles, violence against civilians, remote violence, rioting and protesting 
against a government, and non-violent conflict within the context of war. We use several 
outcome measures. In the baseline econometric model, the conflict intensity of an 
ethnicity-country region is coded as the log transformed fraction of years with at least 
one type of conflict event during 1997-2014. With respect to the sensitivity analysis, we 
also employ alternative measures of conflict prevalence from ACLED and another 
conflict data source, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Events Dataset 
(UCDP GED) developed by Croicu et al. (2012). 
The measure of slave exports is taken from Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), who 
compile ethnic-level slave exports data for the transatlantic and Indian Ocean trade 
routes during 1400-1900. The transatlantic slave trade route was the largest trade route 
of all and it affected almost all countries in our sample. According to Manning’s (1990) 
estimates, approximately 12 million slaves entered the transatlantic route, accounting for 
two-thirds of total slaves shipped from Africa. Compared to the transatlantic slave trade, 
the range of Indian Ocean trade is smaller and confined primarily to the eastern coast of 
Africa. As expected, many countries in our sample, for instance, Madagascar, Malawi, 
 15 
 
Mozambique, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, are largely affected by both the 
transatlantic and Indian Ocean trade. Thus, we use the measure of the total number of 
slaves taken through the two trade routes in the empirical analysis. 
A merit of our study is that we capture the regional geography and location 
factors. Control variables reflecting natural resources (precious metals, industrial metals, 
and diamonds) are drawn from the Mineral Resource Data System (U.S. Geological 
Survey, 1996) by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and the PRIO Diamond 
Resources dataset (Gilmore, 2005). The land endowment data, including land area, 
average elevation, and terrain ruggedness, is collected from the GTOPO30 global digital 
elevation model (U.S. Geological Survey, 1996). Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) 
recommend the inclusion of historical conflict between 1400 and 1700, because they 
find that civil wars in the past have a bearing on contemporary conflict in the same 
region. We use their data and add a binary indicator for the historical conflict to our 
regression specifications. To account for other potential historical confounding factors, 
we also include the pre-colonial characteristics of ethnicities and European contact in the 
colonial period in some specifications. The importance and sources of these variables 
will be discussed when they are introduced. 
Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables of interest at the country-
ethnic homeland level. Panel A gives summary statistics for the full sample. Panel B 
displays summary statistics for observations of the sample that suffered from slave trade, 
while Panel C describes the rest of the sample that was not affected by the trade. At first 
glance, it appears that the prevalence and intensity of civil conflict in the homelands that 
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experienced slave trade are significantly higher. Table 2.1 shows that the mean 
difference in years of conflict events is around 1 year, and the difference is significant at 
the 99% confidence level. As regards the measure for conflict intensity, the average 
number of conflict fatalities in Panel B is 2.4 times more than the respective number in 
Panel C. We also find cross-sectional differences in mean nightlight density in 1996, 
which is employed to proxy for initial regional economic development. The mean 
difference in nightlight density is 0.17. The descriptive statistics reveal that 
contemporary conflict seems more likely to occur in areas that were engaged in slave 
trade between 1400 and 1900. 
 
 
 
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics 
 Obs. Mean St.Dev. min max 
Panel A: Full sample 
Conflict prevalence (years) 813 4.81 5.28 0 18 
Average number of yearly conflict 
fatalities 
813 19.96 247.68 0 6852.66 
Slave exports 813 256.47 2034.94 0 38389.53 
Normalized slave trade (ln(exports/area)) 813 0.66 1.26 0 6.02 
Log of nightlight density in 1996 813 -0.89 2.72 -6.83 6.07 
Panel B: Observations with slave trade 
Conflict prevalence (years) 382 5.32 5.43 0 18 
Average number of yearly conflict 
fatalities 
382 28.76 352.29 0 6852.66 
Slave exports 382 545.85 2943.97 0.09 38389.53 
Normalized slave trade (ln(exports/area)) 382 1.40 1.53 0 6.02 
Log of nightlight density in 1996 382 -0.80 2.63 -6.83 6.07 
Panel C: Observations without slave trade 
Conflict prevalence (years) 431 4.36 5.11 0 18 
Average number of yearly conflict 
fatalities 
431 12.16 75.78 0 1421.28 
Slave exports 431 0 0 0 0 
Normalized slave trade (ln(exports/area)) 431 0 0 0 0 
Log of nightlight density in 1996 431 -0.97 2.80 -6.46 5.28 
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2.4 Estimating Equations and Empirical Results 
We estimate the relationship between past slave exports and the contemporary 
prevalence of civil conflict across country-ethnic regions. For ethnic groups that are 
divided by national borders, we assign each partition to the corresponding country as a 
separate observation. The estimating equation is: 
𝒚𝒊,𝒄 = 𝜶𝒄 + 𝜷 ∗ 𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒊 + 𝑿𝒊,𝒄
′ 𝛀 + 𝐙𝒊
′𝚪 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒄   (𝟐. 𝟏) 
where 𝑦𝑖,𝑐 is the outcome measure of civil conflict in the homeland of ethnic 
group i in country c. 𝛼𝑐 is a country fixed effect to exploit within-country variation. 
𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖 denotes the degree of slave trade that ethnic group i experienced between 
1400 and 1900. Taking into account the differences in the size of ethnic groups, we 
normalize the total slave exports from the transatlantic and Indian Ocean trade routes by 
tribal land area. 
Given the extensive literature on the correlates of conflict (e.g., Fearon and 
Laitin, 2003; Nunn and Puga, 2012; Buhaug and Lujala, 2005), the vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑐 consists 
of a rich set of country-ethnic level covariates that capture the regional geography and 
location characteristics. The geographic controls include land area, three dummy 
variables for natural resource (precious metals, industrial metals, and diamonds) 
endowment, average elevation, terrain ruggedness, temporal variability in temperature in 
1995-2014, and an indicator for access to rivers.2 The location controls include absolute 
                                                 
2 We do not include the factor for trade convenience in our baseline model because the relationship 
between trade and civil conflict is ambiguous and mixed (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). However, 
augmenting the specification with the log of coastline divided by land area, ln(coastline/area) will not 
change our conclusions. These results are available upon request to the author. 
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latitude, the distance from an ethnicity-country region to the corresponding capital city, 
and an indicator for historical conflict between 1400 and 1700. Considering that slave 
trade may affect contemporary conflict through its impacts on economic development, 
we log nightlight density in 1996 in several specifications. The inclusion of initial 
economic development level allows us to explore the direct effects of slave trade on 
conflict risk while controlling for its indirect effects through wealth level. 
Table 2.2 reports OLS estimates of interest when the aforementioned controls are 
included. The dependent variable is measured as the log fraction of years with at least 
one civil conflict event. Column (1) shows the results of regressing current conflict 
prevalence on slave exports with country fixed effects only. Column (2) includes the 
geographic controls, and column (3) further includes the location controls. The 
relationship between slave trade and civil conflict is positive and statistically significant 
across all three specifications. The estimated coefficient of slave exports is as 
economically meaningful as that of temporal variability in temperature. In terms of 
standardized beta coefficients of column (3), a one standard deviation increase in slave 
exports leads to a 0.14 standard deviation increase in predicted prevalence of conflict, 
while a one standard deviation increase in temperature variability is associated with a 
0.17 standard deviation increase in conflict.  
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Table 2.2 OLS Estimates - Relationship between Slave Exports and Civil Conflict 
 Log fraction of years with at least one civil conflict event 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Slave exports 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.019** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
 {0.007} {0.007} {0.007} {0.007} 
Land area  0.072*** 0.073*** 0.069*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Precious metal  0.117** 0.109** 0.093** 
  (0.046) (0.049) (0.044) 
Industrial metal  0.059*** 0.055** 0.037** 
  (0.018) (0.020) (0.017) 
Diamond  0.035 0.035 0.033 
  (0.034) (0.032) (0.030) 
Mean elevation  -0.001 -0.009 -0.005 
  (0.040) (0.035) (0.029) 
Ruggedness  0.026 0.036* 0.036* 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Climate variability  0.258 0.372*** 0.361*** 
  (0.152) (0.099) (0.089) 
Access to river  -0.002 0.004 -0.001 
  (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) 
Absolute latitude   -0.011** -0.012** 
   (0.004) (0.005) 
Distance to Capital city   -0.010 -0.003 
   (0.061) (0.054) 
Historical conflict in 
1400-1700 
  0.073** 0.046 
   (0.034) (0.033) 
Initial light density    0.02*** 
    (0.003) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number obs. 813 813 813 813 
Adj. R-squared 0.21 0.46 0.47 0.51 
Notes: The unit of observation is ethnicity-country region. The dependent variable is the log transformed 
fraction of years with at least one conflict incidence during the period 1997-2014. The slave exports 
variable is the log transformed number of slaves exported through the transatlantic and Indian Ocean 
routes between 1400 and 1900 normalized by land area.  
Below all estimates, standard errors adjusted for clustering within countries are reported in parentheses. The 
alternative standard errors are also reported below the slave exports variable: standard errors adjusted for 
two-way clustering within countries and ethnolinguistic families are reported in square brackets, and Conley 
(1999) standard errors adjusted for two-dimensional spatial correlation are reported in curly brackets. ∗∗∗, 
∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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One natural concern with the estimates in the first three columns in Table 2.2 is 
that slave trade correlates with conflict mainly through its effects on current economic 
performance (Nunn, 2008). To look at this, we include initial nightlight density to 
account for regional differences in income level. As shown in column (4), although the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficient of slave exports is decreased by 17%, the 
coefficient remains positive and significant. The estimates are quantitatively meaningful, 
suggesting that wealth condition may not be the only major mediator between slave trade 
and conflict. 
Three types of standard errors are reported in Table 2.2. Firstly, we cluster 
standard errors at the country level. Given that the 813 ethnic groups are classified into 
84 ethnolinguistic families (Murdock, 1967) and share similar ethnic characteristics 
within an ethnolinguistic family, we also employ the multi-way clustering approach 
(Cameron et al., 2012) and cluster standard errors at the country level and at the 
ethnolinguistic-family level. When analyzing geo-referenced data with potential spatial 
interdependence, it is appropriate to use Conley’s (1999) method, which is robust to 
spatial interdependence of unknown form in the error term. To save space, we only 
present the three sets of standard errors below the estimates of slave exports. It turns out 
that these approaches yield essentially identical standard errors. 
Another concern is that the correlation is confounded by omitting historical 
ethnic-level characteristics. As we mentioned, Africa had been made up of a number of 
ethnicities for a long time. It is highly possible that an ethnicity has its unique traditional 
features that are correlated with the proneness to slave trade and contemporary conflict. 
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As documented in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 
(2011), and Acemoglu et al. (2001), the potential confounders include pre-colonial 
institution, colonial rule, initial levels of prosperity, and European explorer contact. The 
vector Z𝑖 in equation (1) denotes the ethnic-level variables that are meant to account for 
such factors. We employ the number of jurisdictional hierarchies beyond the local 
community to account for pre-colonial ethnicities' political institutions, and we use 
categorical measures of settlement patterns to proxy for pre-colonial economic 
development. Both variables are collected from the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 
1967). With respect to colonial rule, the historical disease conditions, especially the 
prevalence of malaria, plays an important role in determining the impacts of colonial 
rule in Africa. The malaria index is derived from the Malaria Stability Index developed 
by Kiszewski et al. (2004). It is also necessary to distinguish the effects of slave trade 
and non-slave trade European contact on African conflict. We use data on European 
explorer travel records from The Century Atlas (1911), which stretches back to 1768, as 
an indicator for non-slave trade European influence on modern conflict. 
Table 2.3 shows the estimation results when additional ethnic-level controls are 
added in the analysis. We report standard errors adjusted for clustering within countries 
in parentheses, and standard errors adjusted for multi-way clustering within countries 
and ethnolinguistic families in square brackets. Due to data availability, the sample size 
is reduced to 456 when we control for settlement pattern in column (1) or jurisdictional 
hierarchy in column (2). All historical controls except for European explorer contact 
have a bearing on contemporary conflict. Column (5) of Table 2.3 gives the most 
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comprehensive specification. Here, we find that the slave exports variable remains 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Comparing column (5) of Table 2.3 
with column (4) of Table 2.2, we find that the magnitude of the coefficient estimate of 
slave exports even increases after conditioning on ethnic-level controls. 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 OLS Estimates - Relationship between Slave Exports and Civil Conflict,  
with Additional Ethnic-Level Controls 
 Log fraction of years with at least one civil 
conflict event 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Slave exports 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
 [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] 
Jurisdictional hierarchy  0.020*   0.026** 
  (0.012)   (0.011) 
European explorer contact   -0.018  -0.023 
   (0.016)  (0.023) 
Malaria index    -0.005* -0.004 
    (0.002) (0.003) 
Settlement pattern  Yes No No No Yes 
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number obs. 456 456 813 813 456 
Adj. R-squared 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.49 
Notes: The unit of observation is ethnicity-country region. The dependent variable is the log transformed 
fraction of years with at least one conflict incidence during the period 1997-2014. The slave exports 
variable is the log transformed number of slaves exported through the transatlantic and Indian Ocean 
routes between 1400 and 1900 normalized by land area. Settlement pattern includes eight dummies 
indicating eight levels of sophistication of precolonial settlement of ethnic groups. Geographic controls at 
the ethnicity-country level include the natural log of land area, three measures of natural resource 
(precious metals, industrial metals, and diamonds) endowment, average elevation, terrain ruggedness, 
temporal variability in temperature in 1995-2014, and an indicator for access to rivers. Location controls at 
ethnicity-country level include absolute latitude, the distance from an ethnicity-country region to the 
capital city, and an indicator for historical conflict between 1400 and 1700.   
Below all estimates, standard errors adjusted for clustering within countries are reported in parentheses. 
The standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering within countries and ethnolinguistic families are also 
reported below the slave exports in square brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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2.5 Identifying Causal Relationships 
In the previous section, the OLS estimates demonstrated the positive correlation 
between slave trade and contemporary conflict risk. Nonetheless, such correlation cannot 
pin down the causal effects of slave trade on proneness to conflict. Indeed, slave exports 
were unlikely to be randomly distributed across ethnic homelands in our sample. On the 
one hand, there may be unobserved factors that are correlated with slave exports and 
conflict and would bias the estimates of interest. For example, one might argue that 
regions that had been inherently more conflict-inclined before 1400 were more likely to 
be affected during slave trade, and these areas continue to be conflict-prone today. On 
the other hand, if the explanatory variable, slave exports in history, is mismeasured, the 
resulting attenuation bias would shrink the coefficient estimates toward zero. To assess 
whether the uncovered relationship is causal, we pursue an IV approach by employing 
the distances from the centroid of each ethnicity to the locations where slaves were 
demanded. 
The instruments consist of two parts: overland distance and sailing distance. For 
the trans-Atlantic slave trade, we calculate the overland distance from the centroid of 
each ethnic group to the closest point along the seacoast and the sailing distance from the 
African coast to the closest major market in America. According to Nunn (2008), nine 
major markets are selected while constructing the sailing distance: Havana, Cuba; Haiti; 
Kingston, Jamaica; Dominica; Martinique; Guyana; Virginia, USA; Salvador, Brazil; 
and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. For the Indian Ocean slave trade, the overland distance is 
calculated in the same way, and the sailing distance measures the closest distance from 
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the coast to the most important destinations in the Middle East: Mauritius and Muscat, 
Oman. The distance instruments capture an ethnicity's exposure to the trans-Atlantic and 
Indian Ocean slave trades. The longer the trade distances were, the less likely it was that 
the locals were enslaved. Thus, the instruments are correlated with slave exports. The 
slave trade distances are intuitively plausible to satisfy the exclusion restriction, since the 
destinations of slave exports were chosen largely due to the suitable exogenous climate 
conditions for plantation economy. 
We report IV estimates in Table 2.4. The first column reports estimates 
controlling for the country fixed effects, the second column adds geographic controls, 
the third column further includes the location controls, and the fourth column controls 
for our baseline set of control variables, including the ethnic-level controls and control 
variables in column (3). In column (5), we include initial nightlight density to account 
for regional economic development. The first-stage estimates are reported in the bottom 
panel of Table 2.4. The relationship between the instruments and slave exports are 
strongly negative: The Transatlantic and Indian Ocean slave trade distances are both 
significantly related to slave exports at over 95% confidence (column 4). A shorter trade 
distance is typically associated with a greater number of slaves shipped, since the 
transportation cost is lower. The F-statistic is 9.24 in column 4, implying that the 
instruments are not weak. 
  
 25 
 
Table 2.4 IV Estimates on the Effect of Slave Exports on Civil Conflict 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Second stage:   Dependent variable is fraction of years with at least one civil conflict 
event 
Slave exports 0.118** 0.216*** 0.220*** 0.190*** 0.176*** 
 (0.051) (0.076) (0.067) (0.047) (0.045) 
 [0.054] [0.087] [0.076] [0.046] [0.046] 
Initial light density No No No No Yes 
Ethnicity-level controls No No No Yes Yes 
Location controls No No Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Hausman test (p-value) 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Overidentification test (p-
value) 
0.24 0.34 0.14 0.63 0.58 
Number obs. 813 813 813 456 456 
First Stage: Dependent variable is slave exports 
Transatlantic distance -
0.217*** 
-0.101* -0.123** -0.153** -0.146* 
 (0.054) (0.050) (0.054) (0.074) (0.077) 
Indian Ocean distance -
0.241*** 
-
0.202*** 
-
0.194*** 
-
0.264*** 
-
0.257*** 
 (0.075) (0.052) (0.054) (0.065) (0.073) 
F-stat of excl. Instrument 8.28 9.20 6.69 9.24 6.91 
Adj.  0.21 0.24 0.28 0.30 0.30 
Notes: The unit of observation is ethnicity-country region. The dependent variable is the log transformed 
fraction of years with at least one conflict event during the period 1997-2014. The slave exports variable is 
the log transformed number of slaves traded through the transatlantic and Indian Ocean routes between 1400 
and 1900 normalized by land area. Geographic controls at the ethnicity-country level include the natural log 
of land area, three measures of natural resource (precious metals, industrial metals, and diamonds) 
endowment, average elevation, terrain ruggedness, temporal variability in temperature in 1995-2014, and 
an indicator for access to rivers. Location controls at the ethnicity-country level include absolute latitude, 
the distance from an ethnicity-country region to the capital city, and an indicator for historical conflict 
between 1400 and 1700. Ethnicity-level controls include eight fixed effects for the sophistication of 
precolonial settlement, the number of precolonial jurisdictional political hierarchies beyond the local 
community, ranging from 1 to 4, an indicator for contact with precolonial European explorers, and a malaria 
prevalence index.  
Below all estimates, standard errors adjusted for clustering within countries are reported in parentheses. 
For the slave exports variable, standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering within countries and 
ethnolinguistic families are also reported in square brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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The second-stage estimates are reported in the top panel. The coefficients for 
slave exports are generally positive, suggesting that the more slaves it exported, the more 
likely a region is prone to civil conflict in the contemporary era. Furthermore, the 
magnitudes of the IV estimates are approximately 9 times higher than those of the 
analogous OLS estimates, which is probably because selection into the slave trade and 
measurement error largely bias the OLS estimates downward. As evidence, the Hausman 
test in all specifications rejects the null hypothesis that slave exports can be treated as 
exogenous. The effects of slave trade on conflict remain significantly positive when 
controlling for the initial light density in column (5). 
To further explore the sensitivity of our findings, we replace the outcome 
variable by alternative measures of civil conflict prevalence. As described in the 
previous section, the main outcome measure of ACLED civil conflict events comprises 
both battles and non-violent incidents, such as the establishment of rebel bases and 
political protests. Therefore, it is possible that slave trade affects the prevalence of 
conflict by merely acting on the non-fatal and non-violent events. In Table 2.5, we 
conduct the IV estimation using alternative conflict measures that focus on fatal and/or 
violent events. In columns (1)-(2), we apply the subjective 10-deaths threshold to 
measure conflict events. Note that in the country-level analysis, the standard threshold to 
identity civil conflict is 25-deaths. Such conventional threshold does not exist for 
subnational analysis; nonetheless, there are reasons to believe that a 10-deaths threshold 
can screen out non-fatal conflict events at the subnational level. In columns (3)-(4), the 
dependent variable only use battles to account for violent conflict events. In columns 
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(5)-(6), we restrict its domain to battles that result in at least 10 deaths. In odd-numbered 
columns, we control for location and geography. In even-numbered columns, we 
augment the specification with ethnicity-level historic controls. The results show that 
there is a significantly higher prevalence of fatal violence when a region has more slave 
exports. We also provide results by using the UCDP GED dataset in columns (7)-(10). 
Unlike ACLED, the UCDP GED dataset is less inclusive, tracing conflict incidents that 
result in at least one direct death. On the other hand, the UCDP GED dataset has events 
starting from 1989. These features of UCDP GED allow us to check the effects of slave 
trade on the risk of fatal conflict over a longer period (1989-2014). Not surprisingly, the 
results using UCDP GED data paint a consistent picture. 
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Table 2.5 Sensitivity Checks for IV Estimates, with Different Measures of Civil Conflict Prevalence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
Second-stage Log fraction of years with at least one civil conflict event 
Dependent variable               
Any event 10 deaths Any battle Any battle 10 deaths Any UCDP event 
Any UCDP event  
10 deaths 
Slave exports 0.203*** 0.170*** 0.137*** 0.096*** 0.037*** 0.021* 0.101*** 0.082*** 0.052*** 0.040*** 
 (0.060) (0.038) (0.037) (0.030) (0.009) (0.014) (0.029) (0.021) (0.014) (0.009) 
 [0.067] [0.037] [0.039] [0.029] [0.007] [0.011] [0.033] [0.021] [0.017] [0.009] 
Ethnicity-level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Location controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hausman test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Overidentification test  
(p-value) 
0.13 0.54 0.29 0.73 0.21 0.41 0.15 0.28 0.14 0.16 
Number obs. 813 456 813 456 813 456 813 456 813 456 
 
First Stage: Dependent variable is slave exports 
Transatlantic distance -0.123** -0.153** -0.123** -0.153** -0.123** -0.153** -0.123** -0.153** -0.123** -0.153** 
 (0.054) (0.074) (0.054) (0.074) (0.054) (0.074) (0.054) (0.074) (0.054) (0.074) 
Indian Ocean distance -0.194*** -0.264*** -0.194*** -0.264*** -0.194*** -0.264*** -0.194*** -0.264*** -0.194*** -0.264*** 
 (0.054) (0.065) (0.054) (0.065) (0.054) (0.065) (0.054) (0.065) (0.054) (0.065) 
F-stat of excl. instrument 6.69 9.24 6.69 9.24 6.69 9.24 6.69 9.24 6.69 9.24 
Notes: The unit of observation is ethnicity-country region. In columns (1)-(2), the dependent variable is the log fraction of years with at least one 
conflict event that results in 10 or more deaths. In columns (3)-(4), the dependent variable is the log fraction of years with at least one battle event. In 
columns (5)-(6), the dependent variable is the log fraction of years with at least one battle event that resulted in 10 or more deaths. In columns (7)-(8), 
the dependent variable is the log fraction of years with at least one UCDP conflict event. In columns (9)-(10), the dependent variable is the log fraction 
of years with at least one UCDP conflict event that resulted in 10 or more deaths. Geographic controls, Location controls, and Ethnicity-level controls 
are the same as we mentioned in Table 2.4.  
Below all estimates, standard errors adjusted for clustering within countries are reported in parentheses. For the slave exports variable, standard errors 
adjusted for two-way clustering within countries and ethnicities are also reported in square brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
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One thing to note is that the test statistics for the test of overidentifying 
restrictions in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 are not significant across all specifications, which gives 
us the confidence that our instrument set is appropriate. We also undertake several tests 
to ensure the validity of the instruments. 
A potential concern with the exclusion restriction condition is that the overland 
distance of slave trade, which is part of the total trade distance, may be correlated with 
the accessibility of the country to other kinds of sea-based trade. To alleviate this 
concern, we estimate the reduced-from relationship between the prevalence of conflict 
and sailing distance instruments, that is, total slave trade distance minus the overland 
distance. In columns (1) and (3) of Table 2.6, we look first at the relationship between 
total slave trade distances and contemporary conflict. Column (3) includes the ethnicity-
level historic controls at the price of a smaller sample. The results in both columns 
resonate with previous findings reported in Table 2.4: ethnic homelands that were closer 
to the slave trade markets are more likely to have conflict today. Columns (2) and (4) of 
Table 2.6 explore whether sailing distance is still negatively correlated with the 
likelihood of civil conflict. The coefficients are the same in significance and even larger 
when we only use the sailing distances as instruments. This provides strong evidence 
that the relationship between slave trade and conflict does not pick up the effect of other 
kinds of international trade by mere coincidence. 
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Table 2.6 Reduced Form Relationship between Slave Trade Distance and Civil Conflict, 
with or without the Overland Distance Part 
 Log fraction of years with at least one civil conflict event 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Transatlantic distance -0.012*  -0.023**  
 (0.007)  (0.010)  
 [0.007]  [0.11]  
Indian Ocean distance -0.043***  -0.050***  
 (0.007)  (0.011)  
 [0.008]  [0.12]  
Transatlantic sailing 
distance 
 -0.015*  -0.034** 
  (0.009)  (0.017) 
  [0.009]  [0.017] 
Indian Ocean sailing 
distance 
 -0.049***  -0.063*** 
  (0.010)  (0.019) 
  [0.011]  [0.021] 
Ethnicity-level controls No No Yes Yes 
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number obs. 813 813 456 456 
Adj. R-squared 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.49 
Notes: The unit of observation is ethnicity-country region. The dependent variable is the log transformed 
fraction of years with at least one conflict event during the period 1997-2014. Transatlantic distance and 
Indian Ocean distance measure the distance from the centroid of the ethnic group to the closest major 
market of either the Atlantic or Indian Ocean slave trades, including both sailing distance and the distance 
from the centroid of the ethnic group to the African seacoast. Transatlantic sailing distance and Indian 
Ocean sailing distance only measure the distance from the African seacoast to the closest major market of 
slave trade, excluding the overland distance from the centroid of the ethnic group to the African seacoast. 
Geographic controls, Location controls, and Ethnicity-level controls are the same as we mentioned in 
Table 2.4. Below all estimates, standard errors adjusted for clustering within countries are reported in 
parentheses, and standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering within countries and ethnicities are 
reported in square brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels according 
to the standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
We also perform a second falsification test motivated by Nunn (2008) to examine 
the reduced-form relationship between total slave trade distance and conflict outside of 
our sample. The idea is that if the distance instruments affect contemporary conflict only 
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through the Transatlantic and Indian Ocean slave trade, then there should be no 
significant correlation between distance instruments and conflict outside of our sample. 
Otherwise, it could be the case that the distances to the slave markets are correlated with 
distances to other locations that have a bearing on current conflict events. The first two 
columns of Table 2.7 report the reduced-form relationship outside the sample but within 
the African continent. With or without the ethnic-level historic controls, we do not find a 
significant relationship between slave trade distance and prevalence of contemporary 
conflict. Given that regions within sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are more similar in terms 
of economic and social structures than those in Northern Africa, we undertake the same 
reduced-form estimates for regions that are in SSA and hardly affected by the 
Transatlantic and Indian Ocean slave trade. As shown in columns (3) and (4), this 
insignificant relationship is robust to focusing only on SSA counterparts. 
Taking a step back, how robust are our IV estimates if we relax the perfect 
exogeneity assumption? In this way, we allow the instruments to be only “plausibly 
exogenous” (Conley, Hansen and Rossi, 2012). Since our analysis includes two 
instruments, we use principal components analysis to combine our instruments into one 
variable. We then let the instrument have a potential direct effect on current conflict in 
the second-stage regression with a coefficient γ. 
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Table 2.7 Out-of-sample Reduced Form Relationship  
between Slave Trade Distance and Civil Conflict 
 Log fraction of years with at least one civil conflict event 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Transatlantic distance -0.011 -0.020 -0.011 -0.027 
 (0.011) (0.025) (0.010) (0.033) 
 [0.011] [0.026] [0.010] [0.042] 
Indian Ocean distance -0.008 -0.007 -0.012 -0.010 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) 
 [0.006] [0.009] [0.007] [0.013] 
Ethnicity-level controls No Yes No Yes 
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SSA only No No Yes Yes 
Number obs. 342 104 246 65 
Adj. R-squared .49 .46 .59 .54 
Notes: The unit of observation is ethnicity-country region. The dependent variable is the log transformed 
fraction of years with at least one conflict event during the period 1997-2014. Transatlantic distance and 
Indian Ocean distance measure the distance from the centroid of the ethnic group to the closest major 
market of either the Atlantic or Indian Ocean slave trades, including both sailing distance and the distance 
from the centroid of the ethnic group to the African seacoast. Geographic controls, Location controls, and 
Ethnicity-level controls are the same as we mentioned in Table 2.4. Below all estimates, standard errors 
adjusted for clustering within countries are reported in parentheses, and standard errors adjusted for two-
way clustering within countries and ethnicities are reported in square brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Following Conley et al. (2012), we use the union of confidence interval approach 
to estimate the 90% confidence interval of the main effect. Figure 2.2 presents the 
results. The Y-Axis shows the coefficient of slave exports in the second-stage 
regression. It shows that the lower bound intercepts with the zero-line at γ=0.085. That 
is, as long as the direct effect of the instrument on current conflict is smaller than 0.085, 
our second-stage coefficient on slave exports is still significant at the 10% level. Note 
that the overall reduced-form effect of the principal component instrument on conflict is 
0.148. Therefore, the direct effect of the slave trade distance on prevalence of conflict 
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would have to be approximately two-thirds of the overall reduced-form effect to render 
our IV results insignificant. In other words, slave exports only account for one-third of 
the impacts of the distances to the slave markets on conflict, which seems unlikely. 
Thus, our IV estimates are robust even allowing for possible deviations from perfect 
exogeneity. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 90% Confidence Interval of the IV Effect on Contemporary Conflict 
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2.6 Discussing the Possible Channels of Causality 
Slave trades may affect the modern distribution of civil conflict through two 
major channels: economic development and non-economic factors, such as ethnic 
identities, cultural norms of behavior, and local institutions. In both OLS and IV 
estimations, we examine how the inclusion of a proxy for initial economic development 
affects the estimated impact of slave trade. After over-controlling for nightlight density, 
slave exports continue to have a significant and sizable impact, suggesting that the non-
income channels play an important role in explaining the mechanisms. 
We look first at the causal relationship between slave trade and the key 
institutional and cultural variables—ethnic identity, trust, and local governance. The 
2005 Afrobarometer surveys collect individual-level attitudinal data on self-ascribed 
identity, trust, and local government performance. Its surveyed area covers nearly 20% 
of our sample, that is, 161 country-ethnicity regions in 13 countries of SSA. In the 
Afrobarometer surveys, the respondents self-report their identity attitudes: ethnic 
identity only, ethnic identity more than national identity, national and ethnic identities 
equally, national identity more than ethnic identity, and national identity only. To 
construct a measure for ethnic identity, we create a dummy variable equal to 1 if an 
individual feel attached to ethnicity only or more ethnic identity than national identity. 
The generalized trust question asks respondents whether most people can be trusted. The 
respondents answer either 0 (“You must be very careful in dealing with people”) or 1 
(“Most people can be trusted”). For local government performance, the respondents are 
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asked to provide scores on a four-point scale, where 1 is “Strongly Disapprove”, 2 is 
“Disapprove”, 3 is “Approve”, and 4 is “Strongly Approve”. 
The IV estimates for all respondents are reported in Panel A of Table 2.8. The 
specification used in Table 2.8 controls for several individual and regional 
characteristics, which are listed in the notes to the table. Columns (1)-(3) examine 
individual response towards ethnic identity, generalized trust, and local governance, 
respectively. The results lend credence to the view that slave trade may lead to mistrust 
and weak local governance. These results resonate with previous findings by Nunn and 
Wantchekon (2011) on the origins of mistrust in Africa. However, the coefficient for 
ethnic identity is positive but insignificant, probably because some respondents are 
immigrants, so their ancestors did not belong to the historic ethnicity in the surveyed 
area. We then concentrate on the non-mover respondents only (i.e., the individuals’ 
current location is the same as their ancestors’). The results are reported in Panel B of 
Table 2.8. As we would expect, more slave exports yield a stronger sense of ethnic 
identity. Since ethnic identity and national identity are two sides of the same coin, slave 
trade also weakens the sense of national identity. Given that the non-mover group 
accounts for approximately 53% of all respondents, the channel through non-movers’ 
ethnic identity seems fairly important. Columns (2) and (3) of Panel B report the 
estimates on trust and local governance using the non-mover respondents only: the 
coefficients remain negative and significant, with size of the effects being even larger. 
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Table 2.8 IV Estimates on the Effect of Slave Trade  
on Identity, Trust, and Local Governance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Ethnic Identity Trust Local Governance 
 Panel A: All respondents 
Slave exports 0.022 -0.029*   -0.168*** 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.043) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes 
District controls Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnic-country level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number obs. 10,295 10,295 9,561 
    
 Panel B: Non-mover respondents only 
Slave exports 0.064** -0.070**   -0.251*** 
 (0.028) (0.002) (0.077) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes 
District controls Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnic-country level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number obs. 5,583 5,583 5,195 
Notes: The table reports the second-stage results of the IV estimation. The dependent variables are 
individual responses to ethnic trust, trust, and local governance from the Afrobarometer survey. All 
regressions include individual's age, age squared, gender, education, occupation, religion, living 
condition, and district's ethnic structure. We also include all ethnic-country level controls and 
country fixed effects used in Table 2.4. 
  
 
 
We then turn to a qualitative analysis of the relationship between the non-
economic factors and the prevalence of contemporary civil conflict. Due to the limited 
coverage of Afrobarometer, our sample size would be drastically decreased if we match 
it with the measures for trust, local institution, and ethnic identity.3 With less than 14% 
of the overall sample observations, it is difficult to identify the quantitative relationships 
                                                 
3 Within the 813 observations in the original sample size, only 58 have measures for non-mover 
ethnic identity at the ethnicity-country level, while 113 observations have measures for local 
governance and trust at the ethnicity-country level.  
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with precision. However, there are some notable findings we can reference from 
previous studies. First, Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013) document the negative 
correlation of civil war with a lagged measure of trust. Their measure of trust comes 
from the 2011 World Values Survey, which asks respondents the same question as 
Afrobarometer does. Second, the role of ethnic identity on triggering conflict is well 
studied (see, for example, Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Esteban and Ray, 2008, 2011; 
Mitra and Ray, 2014) by both theoretical and empirical works. Third, previous studies 
demonstrate that institutional quality is essential for economic growth (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2014) and conflict 
mitigation (Depetris-Chauvin, 2015). 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
This paper adds to a growing body of literature on the deep-rooted determinants 
of civil conflict. In particular, we address the issue of regional disparities of civil conflict 
likelihood in SSA. Using data for a sample of 813 subnational regions in SSA, this paper 
investigates the relationship between slave trade and the prevalence of civil conflict 
incidence. We find that the long-term effects of slave trade on modern risk of conflict 
are statistically significant and economically meaningful. This relationship is robust to 
potentially confounding characteristics at the ethnic level. It holds even if we narrow the 
outcome measures down to fatal and violent incidence.  
To determine whether this relationship is causal, we pursue an IV estimation that 
uses the distances from each ethnicity to the slaves’ demand locations as instruments for 
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slave exports. The magnitudes of the IV estimates are approximately 9 times higher than 
those of the analogous OLS estimates. We also perform a number of checks concerning 
issues related to the exclusion restriction condition. These checks assess the validity of 
the instruments and the tolerable bounds to possible deviations from the perfect 
exogeneity assumption. 
We then elucidate the mechanisms underlying the uncovered relationship. By 
employing the nightlight data, we show that economic development may not be the only 
major channel. According to our estimates, most impacts of slave trade can be explained 
by the non-economic factors. Using the Afrobarometer individual-level survey data, we 
emphasize the channels through cultural and institutional factors: the large-scale slave 
procurement gave rise to mistrust and a stronger sense of ethnic identity, and it 
weakened local governance, all of which increase the likelihood of civil conflict today.  
Overall, our findings highlight the importance of slave trade, as an historic event, 
in shaping contemporary political development. In terms of policy implications, there is 
no need to feel despair for the regions that have been heavily affected by slave trade. 
Instead, it is better to understand the role of slave trade or other historic events and call 
for tailored conflict mitigation policies. 
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CHAPTER III 
WEATHER SHOCK, SLAVE TRADE, AND CONFLICT:                                          
EVIDENCE FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Civil conflict has been widespread and become one of the major obstacles for 
development, particularly in the sub-Saharan African countries in their post-
independence period. Not surprisingly, understanding the causes of conflict has gained 
increasing attention from academics (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). 
One of the core research questions in this strand of literature is that: Why civil 
conflict events wax and wane over time in the same country or subnational region? 
Proponents of the geography view argue that weather variations may affect the 
likelihood of violence persistently and globally. For instance, Iyigun et al. (2017) shows 
that declining temperature is associated with higher frequency of conflict during 1400-
1900 in Europe, North Africa, and the Near East; further, Hsiang et al. (2013) cover time 
periods from 10,000 BCE to the present and all major world regions, finding that rainfall 
or temperature anomalies have substantial influence on conflict. However, the climate-
war relationship in Africa has been seriously challenged recently. On one hand, the 
primary determinants of civil conflict may be political instead of environmental 
conditions (Buhaug, 2010; Theisen et al., 2011); on the other hand, it is possible that the 
association between weather variables and conflict is in fact largely driven by the 
coincident movements of the global time series (Couttenier and Soubeyran, 2014).  
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Is the geography (climate-war) hypothesis true for the African countries? If it is 
true, what is the underlying channel? If weather is not the (only) main determinant of 
civil conflict in Africa, then which other factors can explain the prevalence of conflict? 
The goal of this study is to empirically address the above questions. We first construct a 
geo-coded disaggregated dataset in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) over 1997–2014. It does 
so by dividing the SSA continent into cells of 0.5 degree of latitude × 0.5 degree of 
longitude, approximately 50 × 50 KM near the equator. We then calculate the within-
year growing season weather shock for each cell by combining the monthly remote 
sensing-based meteorological index of drought, high-resolution land use information, 
and monthly global cropping calendar. The empirical investigation, conducted at the 
cell-year level, establishes that weather shock occurred during the growing season are 
strongly associated with the risk of conflict, no matter what kind of conflict measure it 
is. In contrast, the relationship between the whole year weather shock and conflict is 
rather weak. These results suggest that weather anomalies affect the likelihood of 
conflict mainly through agricultural production shock. Regarding the last question, we 
propose a hypothesis that the historical legacy, such as slave trade, within the African 
context also matters in affecting conflict. To check it, we exploit both weather shock as 
well as its interaction with variation in the exposure to the slave trade during 1400-1900. 
It shows that the effect of adverse weather shock is amplified in areas heavily exposed to 
the slave trade. Since slave trade is one of the most influential events in Africa's history, 
the significant interactive effect between weather variation and slave trade implies that 
geography and history work simultaneously in determining the likelihood of conflict. 
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Our empirical strategy contributes to the existing literature in four ways. First, 
the cell-year panel dataset allows us to explore the relationship between weather 
variation and conflict at the disaggregated level. Previous country-level debates on the 
role of weather conditions have inherent limitations, since the within-country 
heterogeneity may bias the estimates. Given that the range of civil conflict is usually less 
than one-quarter of a country's territory (Raleigh and Hegre, 2009), there might exist a 
possible mismatch between conflict and its driving factors in different regions within the 
same country. 
Second, motivated by Harari and La Ferrara (2015) and von Uexkull et al. 
(2016), we develop a more efficient measure for weather shock. Our raw climate index 
is drawn from the Standardized Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) (Beguería 
et al., 2014). Weather condition is a nonlinear function of rainfall, temperature, and 
evaporation. Therefore, simply using rainfall and/or temperature cannot fully account for 
the impact of climate. As a recently-developed drought index, SPEI is based on the 
monthly climatic water balance as a whole. In other words, the SPEI's main advantage 
lies in its ability to capture the joint effects of precipitation and evaporation (e.g., 
temperature and wind speed). Furthermore, considering that most African countries are 
agrarian societies, conflict sensitivity to weather shock may be largely due to their 
impact on agricultural production. Monthly SPEI data allows us to examine these 
potential channels. If weather variation in the crop growing season is more relevant to 
the risk of conflict and carries more weight than that in the non-growing season, we may 
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claim that agricultural income shock might be the main pathway underlying the climate-
war relationship.  
A third contribution of our paper is the econometric specification. The usual 
specification in the literature (Burke et al., 2015) controls for country fixed effects and 
generic/country-specific time trends. Couttenier and Soubeyran (2014) recommend 
including the country and year fixed effects. A noteworthy feature of the differences-in-
differences specification is that it captures the aggregate time shocks, such as global 
warming, geopolitical transitions, and prices movements of the primary commodities. In 
other words, the omission of year fixed effects might lead to spurious relationship 
between weather shock and conflict. We employ the standard differences-in-differences 
specification as the benchmark model and control for the country-specific trends in some 
specifications. We demonstrate that the association between weather shock and civil 
conflict is robust to the inclusion of year fixed effects and country-specific trends. 
A forth contribution is that we look at the interaction between weather shock and 
exposure to the slave trade. The findings show that the more slaves it exported, the more 
sensitive a cell is to weather variation in terms of risk of conflict. These results are 
robust when controlling for the interaction between weather shock and a battery of other 
possible confounding variables. Furthermore, we pursue the instrumental variable (IV) 
approach to overcome the potential endogeneity of slave trade on civil conflict. 
Motivated by the study of Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), we use the interaction between 
distance from the seacoast and weather shock as the instrumental variables for the 
interaction between slave exports and weather shock. Unlike Nunn and Wantchekon’s 
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instrument, which are seacoast distance at the ethnic level, we calculate our distance 
variable at the cell level and multiply it with weather shock. As such, this paper also 
relates to the empirical approaches recently taken by Becker and Woessmann (2009) and 
Rubin (2014), who also employ distance indicators as IVs to investigate the effects of a 
historic event. The IV approach makes it credible to assert that the historical legacy of 
slave trade exacerbates the impact of weather shock on contemporaneous conflict risk. 
This chapter is related to a large and growing body of literature on climate and 
violence. The cornerstone research by Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) firstly use 
year-to-year rainfall variation to instrument economic shocks, and document the strong 
causal effect of adverse income shocks on civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
before 2000. Many subsequent empirical studies also support the relationship between 
weather variability and conflict, e.g. in SSA (Burke, Miguel, Satyanath, Dykema, & 
Lobell, 2009; Couttenier & Soubeyran, 2014), Somalia (Maystadt, Ecker, & Mabiso, 
2013), Kenya (Adano, Dietz, Witsenburg, & Zaal, 2012), India (Bohlken & Sergenti, 
2010), and historical China (Bai & Kung, 2011; Jia, 2014). Nevertheless, this strand of 
research is recently challenged from two directions. First, the ethno-political conditions 
for African countries are more relevant than weather variables in explaining the 
occurrence of violent conflict (Buhaug, 2010; Theisen et al., 2011). Second, the 
relationship between weather shock and conflict seems not robust across different 
econometric specifications and measures of weather variable (Couttenier and Soubeyran, 
2014). We advance this literature by introducing a more prominent weather measure and 
examining the link between the two at disaggregated levels. Our results resonate with 
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most previous studies that acknowledge the relationship between weather shock and 
conflict. In addition, our findings suggest that agricultural production shocks may be the 
major pathway through which weather variation affects the likelihood of conflict. 
This chapter also speaks to the literature on the role of slave trade for conflict and 
development. Acemoglu et al. (2005) argue that the rise of Western Europe after 1500 is 
largely due to access to Atlantic trade, which of course consists of slave trade with 
Africa. Nunn (2008) provides an empirical analysis of the negative relationship between 
the scale of slave trade and contemporary economic development in African countries. 
Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) then find that people’s trust levels within Africa can be 
explained by slave trade. The long-term effects of slave trade on Africa's social structure 
are studied as well. Dalton and Leung (2014) document that males were 
disproportionately enslaved, which has led to prolonged abnormal sex ratios and high 
polygyny rates. Our paper adds to the existing literature by documenting the interactive 
effect between slave trade and weather shock. 
On a broader scale, this work relates to the debates between the “geography 
matters” and the “history matters” views (Nunn, 2009). Proponents of the geography 
view stress the importance of geographic factors, such as climate, natural resources, and 
the disease environment in determining the current development and conflict. To some 
extent, the climate-war relationship can be classified as a strand of the “geography 
matters” view. On the other hand, proponents of the “history matters” view argue that 
despite the direct effect of geography on contemporaneous development, geographic 
characteristics also have an indirect effect through their influence on historical events. 
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For example, Nunn and Puga (2007) explore the two channels for geographic 
characteristic, terrain ruggedness. On one hand, terrain ruggedness has a direct negative 
effect on current economic development. On the other hand, ruggedness in Africa 
increased the costs of slave procurement since people could hide themselves in caves 
and mountains to escape from the slave raiders. So, terrain ruggedness also has an 
indirect positive effect on long-run development through history. In the case of terrain 
ruggedness, the positive effect of geography through history is economically more 
meaningful than its negative direct effect. In addition to Nunn and Puga’s explanation, 
our interaction analysis provides another point of view: both geographic and historic 
characteristics (in our paper, weather shock and slave trade) can jointly affect the 
contemporaneous conflict. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses data 
and measurement. The effect of weather shock on civil conflict is presented in Section 
3.3. The interaction results are reported in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Data and Measurement 
We disaggregate our sample into 0.5 × 0.5 decimal degrees’ grid cells, which 
consists of 62,460 cell-year observations from 27 SSA countries over 1997-2014. The 
sample size is limited due to the subnational level data availability of slave exports. 
Details will be given when the source of slave exports is introduced in the following 
parts. The panel structure of the data allows us to study how weather shock affects the 
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occurrence and intensity of conflict within countries, while controlling for the cell level 
heterogeneity. 
Data on civil conflict, our outcome variable, is collected from the ACLED 
(Armed Conflict Location and Event Data) (Raleigh et al., 2010). Regarded as the most 
comprehensive dataset, ACLED records a range of civil conflicts in African states, 
including battles, violence against civilians, remote violence, rioting and protesting 
against a government, and non-violent conflict within the context of the war. The 
measure of conflict used in the baseline model is conflict incidence, which equals one if 
at least one conflict event happened in the given cell-year, otherwise zero. In some 
scenarios, we are also interested in the effect of weather shock on the outbreak and 
intensity of conflict. For instance, as a persistent variable, the likelihood of conflict 
incidence in the current year might be largely influenced by lagged conflict events. 
Hence, we construct conflict onset as an alternative measure of dependent variable, 
which equals to 1 if 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 = 1|𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 = 0 for a given 
cell. The conflict intensity measure takes into account the total number of conflict events 
occurred in the cell-year. Figure 3.1 maps the incidence of conflict in the sample. It 
shows that Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, as well as the Western African countries were 
more likely being under fire in the past two decades. 
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Figure 3.1 Average Likelihood of Civil Conflict Incidence per Year at the Cell Level 
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We calculate weather shock based on the SPEI drought index (Vicente-Serrano et 
al., 2010; Beguería et al., 2014). The gridded SPEI dataset is available at spatial 
resolution of 0.5 × 0.5-decimal degrees and provides monthly climate indicators from 
1901 to 2014. The average value of SPEI is 0, and the standard deviation is 1. The 
standardization of SPEI allows us to compare SPEI values over time and space. We 
firstly construct the within-year weather variation, SPEI shock, by measuring fraction of 
12 months in which SPEI value was below its mean by at least one standard deviation. 
We also consider the possibility that weather shock in certain months carries 
more weight than those in the rest of the year. If agricultural production is the major 
channel through which climate influences conflict, then it makes more sense to focus on 
the effect of weather shock during the crop growing season. Thus, we rely on the 2005 
Spatial Production Allocation Model (You et al., 2014) to identify the main crop for 
each cell by harvest area, and then retrieve the growing-season months for these main 
crops by overlaying the SAGE Crop Calendar Dataset (Sacks et al., 2010). The top seven 
main crops planted in Africa is displayed in Figure 3.2. The growing season SPEI shock 
is measured as a share of growing season months with SPEI ≤ −1. Figure 3.3 portrays 
the distribution of average growing season SPEI shock per year. 
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Figure 3.2 The Spatial Distribution of Popular Main Crops in Africa at the Cell Level 
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Figure 3.3 The Average Growing Season SPEI Shock per Year at the Cell Level 
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Another independent variable of interest is the severity of slave trade. Nunn and 
Wantchekon (2011) trace slave exports through the transatlantic and Indian Ocean trade 
routes during 1400-1900 at the ethnic level. We further disaggregate Nunn and 
Wantchekon's data into the cell level by combining information on the distribution of 
ethnic groups from Murdock’s (1959) ethnolinguistic map. Besides the transatlantic and 
Indian Ocean trade routes, there existed two other slave trade routes, namely the Red Sea 
and trans-Saharan routes. However, the subnational slave exports data is not available 
yet for the latter two routes. Thus, we have to drop off the countries that were mainly 
affected by the Red Sea and trans-Saharan slave trade routes. Figure 3.4 maps the 
distribution of slave exports in our sample. As shown in Figure 3.4, slave trade through 
the transatlantic and Indian Ocean routes has a bearing on most of the SSA areas. Taking 
into account the differences in the size of cells across different latitudes, we normalize 
the slave exports by surface land area. 
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Figure 3.4 The Number of Slave Exports at the Cell Level 
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Table 3.1 presents the summary description of our panel sample. First, the 
average likelihood of conflict incidence is almost 10% per year, while the likelihood of 
new conflict outbreak is approximately 5%. Second, the mean probabilities of SPEI 
shock and growing season SPEI shock are very similar (12%), implying that a great 
number of cells suffer weather shock in the months outside the growing season. Third, 
on average there are about 24 slaves taken for each cell. In addition, we also include a 
set of time varying control variables, such as the index for democracy and rule of law, 
the log of population and GP per capita. The country-level characteristics on population 
and income level are often cited in the literature of conflict (Blattman and Miguel, 
2010). Buhaug (2010) recommends the inclusion of political conditions because they 
find that African civil wars can be explained by political variables instead of climate 
variation. To account for the political institutions, we also include the country-level 
Polity IV indicator as a proxy for democracy, as well as assessment score for rule-of-law 
from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufman et al., 2011). 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Panel Sample 
 Observations Mean S.D. min Max 
Panel A Conflict 
Conflict incidence  62,460 0.091     0.288           0           1 
Number of conflict events 62,460 0.159 0.608  0 8 
Conflict onset 58,990 0.048 0.213  0 1 
      
    Panel B Weather shock 
SPEI shock 61,848 0.121 0.158 0 1 
Growing season SPEI shock 62,460 0.120 0.184 0 1 
Growing season consecutive 
SPEI shock 
62,460 0.108 0.168 0 1 
 
 Panel C Slave exports 
Total slave exports 1400-1900 62,460 24.044 109.845 0 1117 
Normalized slave exports            62,460 0.774 1.220 0 5.979 
 
            Panel D Other time variant variables 
Polity IV index for democracy 59,352 2.198 4.213 -7 9 
Rule and Law index 52,050 -0.946 0.637 -2.205 0.366 
Log (population) 62,460 3.120 0.916 -0.227 5.179 
Log (GDP per capita) 62,460 7.637 0.861 5.976 10.59 
 
 
 
3.3 The Effect of Weather shock on Conflict 
We first investigate the effect of weather shock on the likelihood of civil conflict 
within countries. Let us denote by i a gridded cell, c a country and t a year. In general, 
the empirical specification takes the following form: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛽𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑐,𝑡
′ Ω + Z𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ Γ + 
𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑐,𝑡                                                 (3.1) 
where 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 denotes the outcome variables of incidence, onset, or intensity of a conflict 
in a given cell of a country, during a given year. 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 represents the cell-year SPEI 
weather variation: alternatively (i) the SPEI shock that aggregates the weather variation 
over the whole year; (ii) the growing season SPEI shock; (iii) the lagged weather shock 
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is included in some specifications, in case weather anomalies might induce conflict 
events to be displaced in time. In all estimations, we control for location fixed effects 
𝛼𝑖,𝑐 and year fixed effects 𝑡. The former captures the unobserved time-invariant cell-
specific characteristics. The latter accounts for the effect of yearly worldwide changes. 
In some specifications, we also include country-specific time trends, as they are often 
used in the literature. The vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑐 consists of a set of country level covariates that 
capture the time varying characteristics, such as indicators for democracy, rule-of-law, 
GDP per capita, and populations. Z𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 is a cell-level dummy variable indicating whether 
a location i was involved in civil conflict during the previous year. 
When the dependent variables are binary (incidence and onset of conflict), the 
two-level mixed effects logit estimator is our preferred estimator. The mixed logit model 
extends the standard conditional logit model by allowing for random effects for many 
levels of nested clusters. In our study, a two-level mixed effects logistic regression can 
specify random intercepts to take into account the dependence between observations 
within countries and cells over time (Gelman and Hill, 2006). When the dependent 
variable is the number of conflict events, we employ the fixed-effects linear model. 
Across all specifications, the robust standard errors are clustered at the cell level.   
We first consider the whole year weather shock. As mentioned earlier, the whole 
year SPEI shock is measured as a ratio of the number of months within a year with SPEI 
≤ −1 over 12. Table 3.2 reports the relationship between the whole year weather shock 
and the likelihood of conflict incidence. The first three columns estimate the 
contemporaneous effect of SPEI shock, while the last three columns estimate both 
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contemporaneous and lagged effects of SPEI shocks. Column (1) and (4) show the 
simplest differences-in-differences specification, including only the location fixed 
effects and year fixed effects. In Column (2) and (5), we add several time varying 
covariates, such as indicators for democracy and rule-of-law, log population, log GDP 
per capita, and incidence of past conflict incidence (lagged by one 4-year period). 
Column (3) and (6) includes additional country-specific time trends. The results show 
that the link between whole year weather shock and conflict is generally positive but 
weak, with most of the coefficients of interest across all specifications are insignificant. 
Our cell-year analysis echoes the previous findings by Buhaug (2010) and Couttenier 
and Soubeyran (2014) at the country level and Theisen et al. (2011) at the subnational 
level that the relationship between whole year weather anomalies and conflict is not 
robust. 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 Whole Year Weather shock and Conflict 
  Dependent Var.: Conflict Incidence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Whole year SPEI shock -0.039 0.178 0.136 -0.030 0.223* 0.159 
 (0.113) (0.119) (0.127) (0.110) (0.129) (0.137) 
Whole year SPEI shock, t-1    -0.050 0.016 -0.156 
    (0.103) (0.120) (0.130) 
Time varying controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-specific time trend No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 82,512 65,313 65,313 82,512 60,950 60,950 
Notes: The unit of observation is a cell-year. The time varying covariates comprise cell-level past 
conflict dummies and a set of country-level controls, including Polity IV indicators for democracy, 
indicators for rule and law, log population, and log GDP per capita. Robust standard errors clustered by 
cell are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent 
level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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We then consider conflict sensitivity to the growing season weather shock, which 
is measured as a share of main crop growing season months with SPEI ≤ −1. Table 3.3 
provides our results. The model specifications used in Table 3.3 are the same in Table 
3.2. Columns (1)-(3) explore whether conflict incidence is correlated with 
contemporaneous growing season drought. In all three columns, there is a positive and 
significant correlation between growing season SPEI shock and the risk of conflict 
incidence. The effect is also quantitatively meaningful: the odds ratio of experiencing at 
least one conflict event will be increased by a range between 20%-31% if a given cell 
suffers weather shock during the entire growing season. In columns (4)-(6) we look to 
see whether the lagged growing season SPEI shock is also correlated with the prevalence 
of conflict, conditioning on current shock. The results show that the magnitude and 
significance of the impact of current growing season weather shock remains similar to 
the ones in columns (1)-(3) of Table 3.3. The occurrence of conflict appears to be hardly 
affected by the lagged growing season SPEI shock. This is not surprising as SPEI is a 
cumulative meteorological measure that combines climate conditions for a range of 
accumulation periods. 
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Table 3.3 Growing Season Weather shock and Conflict 
  Dependent Var.: Conflict Incidence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Growing season SPEI shock 0.175* 0.278** 0.215* 0.169* 0.260** 0.240* 
 (0.105) (0.114) (0.119) (0.106) (0.125) (0.130) 
Growing season SPEI shock, 
t-1 
   
0.047 0.083 -0.132 
    (0.100) (0.114) (0.124) 
Time varying controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-specific time trend No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 62,442 49,436 49,436 62,442 46,130 46,130 
Notes: The unit of observation is a cell-year. The time varying covariates comprise cell-level past 
conflict dummies and a set of country-level controls, including Polity IV indicators for democracy, 
indicators for rule and law, log population, and log GDP per capita. Robust standard errors clustered by 
cell are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent 
level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
 
In Table 3.4 we replicate the analysis using two different measures of conflict: 
conflict onset and intensity. We focus on the contemporaneous growing season SPEI 
shock since the lagged shock does not substantially affect the prevalence of conflict. We 
find that an increase in the duration of drought during the growing season significantly 
increases the probability of conflict onset (columns (1)-(3)) and intensity (columns (4)-
(6)). It is worth noting that conflict intensity is a count variable that gives the number of 
conflict events. Hence, we employ a linear probability model when dealing with conflict 
intensity. The quantitative interpretation of our results on conflict intensity is 
straightforward: in terms of standardized beta coefficient of column (6), a one standard 
deviation increase in growing season SPEI shock leads to a 0.16 standard deviation 
increase in predicted number of conflict events. 
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Table 3.4 Growing Season Weather shock and Conflict,  
with Different Measures of Conflict 
Dependent Var. Conflict Onset # Conflict Events 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Growing season SPEI 
shock 
0.203* 0.296** 0.306** 0.025* 0.037** 0.048*** 
 (0.111) (0.119) (0.123) (0.015) (0.156) (0.014) 
Time varying controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-specific time 
trend 
No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 58,973 49,436 49,436 62,460 49,450 49,450 
Notes: The unit of observation is a cell-year. The time varying covariates comprise cell-level past 
conflict dummies and a set of country-level controls, including Polity IV indicators for democracy, 
indicators for rule and law, log population, and log GDP per capita. Robust standard errors clustered by 
cell are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent 
level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
 
Comparing the impacts of whole year and growing season SPEI shocks, the 
results from Table 3.2 to 3.4 suggest that weather shock during main crop growing 
season carries more weight than that in the rest of the year. Since the growing season 
SPEI value is essentially an agriculture-relevant drought indicator, our primary 
independent variable proxies a sudden fall in agricultural yields induced by drought. The 
loss in main crop harvest may result in a severe income shock in agrarian economies in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. This clearly implies that climatic extremes affect civil conflict 
through agricultural incomes. In the next section, we also look to see whether contextual 
history enlarges the effect of weather-induced crop failure. 
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3.4 Interactions Between Weather Shock and Slave Trade 
As we mention above, slave trade has a long-run effect on the current economic 
and political outcomes. Chapter II particularly demonstrates a robust relationship 
between intensity of the slave trade and prevalence of civil conflict in contemporaneous 
Africa. They argue that slave trade persistently affects the distribution of conflict 
through two equally important channels: economic development and non-economic 
factors, such as ethnic identities, local institution, and the level of trust. It is reasonable 
to assume that these altered cultural and institutional factors may interact with short term 
weather shock in triggering conflict. An underlying implication of this hypothesis is that 
conflict sensitivity to weather shock varies across places due to the exposure to the 
remarkable past event that took place hundreds of years ago. 
To investigate this issue, we exploit the interaction of agricultural-relevant 
weather shock with intensity of the slave exports to estimate the following equation: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑐 + 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑐 + 𝑋𝑐,𝑡
′ Ω + Z𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ Γ + 
𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑐,𝑡      (3.2) 
where 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑐 denotes the number of slaves traded through the transatlantic and Indian 
Ocean routes between 1400 and 1900 normalized by land area at the cell level. 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 
denotes the growing season SPEI shock in a given location, during a given year. The 
whole year SPEI shock is not used since we do not find it is significantly correlated with 
the prevalence of conflict. Similar with equation (3.1), the specification includes cell and 
year fixed effects, as well as a set of time-varying controls. Note that, the inclusion of 
cell fixed effects allows us to account for the main effects of any time-invariant location-
specific characteristics, including the slave trade. The standard errors are clustered at the 
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cell level. The main coefficient of interest in this section is . Under the null hypothesis 
=0, the effect of growing season weather shock on conflict is isolated and irrespective 
of exposure to the slave trade. We expect the sign of  to be positive: the locations from 
which more slaves were shipped are less developed in terms of wealth level and 
institutions, and should be more relatively affected by weather-induced agricultural 
income shocks. 
Table 3.5 delivers the baseline results of equation (3.2). In odd-numbered 
columns, we take the standard differences-in-differences specification. In even-
numbered columns, we augment the specification with country-specific time trends. 
Once we condition on the interactive effect between slave trade and weather shock, the 
main effects of growing season weather shock remain positive in all specifications 
except for column (6), although it is only statistically significant in column (3). In 
columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6), we find the coefficients on our interaction term are all 
positive and statistically significant, that is, areas heavily exposed to the slave trade are 
more sensitive to the effect of growing season weather shock on the probability of 
conflict incidence or conflict intensity. Nevertheless, the coefficients on the interaction 
term are positive and insignificant in columns (3)-(4), indicating that the effects of 
weather shock on conflict onset are not heterogeneous across the intensities of slave 
trade. 
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Table 3.5 Growing Season Weather shock, Slave Trade, and Conflict  
Dependent Var. Conflict 
Incidence 
Conflict Onset # Conflict Events 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Growing season SPEI shock 0.169 0.043 0.251* 0.227 0.017 -0.017 
 (0.135) (0.141) (0.140) (0.146) (0.021) (0.019) 
Growing season SPEI 
shockSlave  
0.133* 0.219** 0.051 0.096 0.023* 0.026** 
 (0.080) (0.089) (0.089) (0.092) (0.012) (0.011) 
Time varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-specific time trend No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 49,436 49,436 49,436 49,436 49,450 49,450 
Notes: The unit of observation is a cell-year. The time varying covariates comprise cell-level past 
conflict dummies and a set of country-level controls, including Polity IV indicators for democracy, 
indicators for rule and law, log population, and log GDP per capita. Robust standard errors clustered by 
cell are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent 
level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
 
The results in the previous section suggest that places that have longer extreme 
weather conditions in the growing season more prone to conflict. Furthermore, the effect 
is amplified if the places severely suffered from slave trade. However, one might argue 
that the consecutive weather anomalies during the growing season are more relevant to 
agricultural production than the separate extreme weather events. Following Harari and 
La Ferrara (2015), we also measure weather shock by using the fraction of consecutive 
growing season months in which SPEI ≤ −1. Table 3.6 contains the results for this 
alternative weather shock variable. The odd-numbered columns repeat the estimation for 
the main effects of weather shock on the incidence, onset, and intensity of conflict; while 
the even-numbered columns re-examine the intensifying effect of slave trade on weather 
shock. The results are very similar: first, consecutive weather shock is positively 
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correlated with the conflict outcome variables, although the effect is not statistically 
significant for the intensity of conflict; second, regions that have fewer slaves exported 
seem relatively resilient to weather shock. Consistently with the results shown in Table 
3.5, the coefficients of the interaction term are significant for the incidence and intensity 
of conflict at the 95% confidence level and not significant for conflict onset. 
 
 
 
Table 3.6 Consecutive Weather shock, Slave Trade, and Conflict 
Dependent Var. Conflict 
Incidence 
Conflict Onset # Conflict Events      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Consecutive growing 
season  
0.216* 0.043 0.315** 0.261* 0.009 -0.018 
SPEI shock (0.127) (0.150) (0.133) (0.157) (0.016) (0.021) 
Consecutive growing 
season  
 0.219**  0.067  0.030** 
SPEI shock  Slave  (0.094)  (0.097)  (0.013) 
Time varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-specific time 
trend 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 49,436 49,436 49,436 49,436 49,450 49,450 
Notes: The unit of observation is a cell-year. The time varying covariates comprise cell-level past 
conflict dummies and a set of country-level controls, including Polity IV indicators for democracy, 
indicators for rule and law, log population, and log GDP per capita. Robust standard errors clustered by 
cell are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent 
level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
 
Another potential concern is that the interaction between weather shock and 
exposure to the slave trade may coincidently pick up the interactive effect between 
weather shock and some location or historical characteristic that might be related with 
the intensity of slave exports. For instance, regions that had fewer slaves exported also 
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had less contact with the Europeans in the colonial period, implying that those regions 
were less affected by the colonial rule. If it is the case, the interaction between exposure 
to the slave trade and weather shock perhaps is proxying for an interaction between the 
exposure to colonial rule and weather shock. A similar reasoning could be applied to 
other cell-specific characteristics, such as the mountainous terrain, fraction of urban 
area, malaria index, distance to borders, distance to historical conflict locations, as well 
as the levels of historical institution and economic development. 
We consider these possibilities in Table 3.7, where we include in our estimation 
additional interaction terms between weather shock and the potential cell-level 
confounders discussed above. The dependent variable used is conflict incidence. The 
main effect of weather shock remains positive in most specifications but insignificant. 
Most importantly, the coefficient of the interaction term between weather shock and 
exposure to slave trade is robust to the inclusion of alternative interactions. The point 
estimates for the interaction term of interest are quantitatively close to the benchmark 
estimation shown in column (2) of Table 3.5. It suggests that the interaction results 
cannot be explained by other location or historical factors, and it is fully accounted for 
by the exposure to slave trade. 
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 Table 3.7 Weather shock, Slave Trade, and Conflict, with Alternative Interactions 
Dependent Var. Conflict Incidence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Growing season SPEI shock 0.017 0.037 0.153 -0.145 -0.102 0.087 0.490 0.165 
 (0.189) (0.147) (0.230) (0.207) (0.221) (0.291) (0.406) (0.148) 
Growing season SPEI 
shockSlave 
0.220** 0.239*** 0.242*** 0.246*** 0.264*** 0.197** 
0.220** 0.242*** 
 (0.089) (0.090) (0.094) (0.092) (0.089) (0.095) (0.096) (0.088) 
Growing season SPEI shock          
 Mountainous Terrain Yes No No No No No No No 
 Urban Area No Yes No No No No No No 
 Malaria Index No No Yes No No No No No 
 Distance to Borders No No No Yes No No No No 
 Distance to Historical Conflict No No No No Yes No No No 
 Historical Institution No No No No No Yes No No 
 Historical Economic 
Development 
No No No No No No Yes No 
 European Explorer Contact No No No No No No No Yes 
Time varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-specific time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 49,436 49,436 49,436 49,436 49,436 39,486 39,486 49,436 
Notes: The unit of observation is a cell-year. The time varying covariates comprise cell-level past conflict dummies and a set of country-level 
controls, including Polity IV indicators for democracy, indicators for rule and law, log population, and log GDP per capita. Robust standard errors 
clustered by cell are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent 
level 
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One might well worry that the estimation for our interaction term is biased by 
some other omitted variables that are not included in Table 3.7, or our key explanatory 
variable—the number of slave exports during 1400 to 1900—may have measurement 
error. To address this concern, we exploit the exogenous variation in the distance of each 
cell from its nearest seacoast to construct the instrumental variable. Distance from the 
seacoast is correlated with the costs of procuring and transporting slaves, and thus our 
instrumental variable, the interaction between distance from the coast and weather shock 
is correlated with the interaction between slave trade intensity and weather shock. One 
potential violation to the exclusion restriction is that the distance from the seacoast may 
be correlated with the contemporaneous trade openness. However, Blattman and Miguel 
(2010) survey the literature on the relationship between trade and civil conflict and find 
it is ambiguous and mixed. This alleviates concerns that modern international trade, 
which is also affected by distance from the seacoast, may have an interactive effect with 
weather shock on the prevalence of conflict. 
We report IV results for each of the three measures of conflict in Table 3.8. 
Because the endogenous variable is an interaction term between growing season weather 
shock and slave trade intensity, the instrumental variable should also be an interaction 
term between weather shock and distance from the seacoast. Due to the difficulty to 
program the interaction term with instrumental variable in the mixed-effects logit model, 
we show the results obtained with a fixed-effects linear estimator. Therefore, the 
magnitudes of the IV estimates are not comparable with the previous results obtained 
through the logit estimator. Nevertheless, the second-stage estimates report a positive 
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and highly significant interactive effect between the slave trade and weather shock on 
the incidence and intensity of conflict. These relationships shown in Table 3.8 are 
consistent with the findings in the previous section, that is, the legacy of slave trade still 
matters on the likelihood of current conflict by amplifying the effect of adverse weather-
induced agricultural income shock. 
 
 
 
Table 3.8 Weather shock, Slave Trade, and Conflict: IV Estimates 
Second Stage 
Dependent Var. 
Conflict Incidence Conflict Onset # Conflict Events 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Growing season SPEI 
shock 
-0.015 -0.018 0.008 0.008 -0.092*** -0.085*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.031) (0.029) 
Growing season SPEI 
shockSlave  
0.044*** 0.032** 0.007 0.001 0.145*** 0.101*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.028) (0.026) 
Time varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-specific time 
trend 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 49,450 49,450 49,450 49,450 49,450 49,450 
First Stage: Dependent Variable is Growing Season SPEI Shock Slave Exports  
Growing season SPEI 
shock  Distance to 
the Seacoast 
-1.6*** -1.5*** -1.6*** 
-
1.6*** 
-1.6*** -1.6*** 
 (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) 
F-stat of excl. 
instrument 
843.74 856.84 843.74 856.84 843.74 856.84 
Notes: The unit of observation is a cell-year. The time varying covariates comprise cell-level past conflict 
dummies and a set of country-level controls, including Polity IV indicators for democracy, indicators for 
rule and law, log population, and log GDP per capita. Robust standard errors clustered by cell are reported 
in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at 
the 10 percent level. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we conduct an empirical analysis of the geographical and 
historical determinants of contemporaneous conflict in SSA. We construct a 
disaggregated dataset of observations of 0.5 × 0.5-decimal degrees, by overlaying the 
geographical information on SPEI drought index, crops land use, monthly cropping 
calendar, slave exports, as well as the incidence, onset, and intensity of conflict. 
The first part of the study investigates the relationship between weather shock 
and the risk of conflict. We improve the usual measure of weather anomalies using a 
more comprehensive drought index and focusing on the weather variation during the 
crop growing season. We also control for the year fixed effects to account for the global 
time effects, that are often neglected in the literature. The analysis contributes to the 
debates on the link between climate and conflict by providing evidence that growing 
season weather shock, instead of whole year weather shock, has a significant and 
positive effect on the likelihood of conflict. The findings suggest a potential agricultural 
income channel through which the weather shock works. 
The second part shows that the relationship between weather shock and conflict 
is significantly amplified in conjunction with exposure to the slave trade. The significant 
interaction effect on the incidence and intensity of conflict remains through a set of 
robustness checks. Our results shed light on the mechanisms of how geography and 
history jointly affect the current political outcomes. The legacy of slave trade may act as 
a “shock multiplier”, and certainly prove its importance in determining the modern 
development. 
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CHAPTER IV 
HOW NATIONS’ WEALTH INTERACTS WITH AID AND PEACE:                                 
A TIME AND COUNTRY VARIANT ANALYSIS* 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Scholars generally agree that foreign assistance, development, and conflict are 
interrelated but they are not agreed on the underlying causalities. Foreign aid, conflict 
reduction strategies and poverty eradication strategies might be made more effective 
with a better understanding of the causal relationships and consequences among these 
variables. There have been numerous empirical studies concerning foreign aid, conflict, 
and development, but none consider these variables together in one model. 
Conflict ought to be central in the study of development for developing countries, 
especially for the poorest countries. In any given year over the last decade, 25-30 
countries had internal armed conflict. Collier (2008) calculates that economic growth is 
reduced by 2.3% per year on average due to conflict. World Bank suggests that conflict 
is a prevalent global issue, not merely a special case, claiming that state fragility and 
conflict exact terribly tolls on over 600 million people across the world (World 
Development Report, 2011). We also find from our sample that almost 80% of conflict-
affected nations are among the world’ poorest countries.  Conflict is portrayed as 
                                                 
* A previous version of this chapter has been presented by myself in the 2016 Agricultural & Applied 
Economics Association Annual Meeting in August 1st at Boston, Massachusetts. The title of the presented 
paper is "How wealth of nations interact with aid and peace: A time and country variant analysis". The 
authors reserve the copyright and permit to include in my dissertation all of the material from the 
conference paper. 
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“development in reverse” (Collier, 2008), or “stymieing development and 
macroeconomic growth” (Stewart et al., 2000).  
Conflict events are not distributed randomly across the world. Collier used the 
term “Conflict Trap” because he found conflict incidences disproportionally occur in a 
group of about 50 countries, comprising “the bottom billion” population of the world 
(Collier, 2007). The United Nations also recognized this phenomenon and identified 29 
conflict-affected countries. The assumption of conflict trap is that conflict degrades the 
structural factors, such as infrastructure, commerce, education, and governance, which 
tends to facilitate future conflict. In other words, the chief legacy of a conflict is another 
conflict (Collier, 2007). Compared to the “development in reverse” statement, “Conflict 
Trap” presents a much stronger proposition, implying that conflict-affected countries 
cannot emerge from poverty and conflict without foreign assistance. 
The correlates of conflict are by now well-discussed. Humphreys (2003), 
Blattman and Miguel (2010) offer comprehensive discussions on the “causes”4 and 
effects of conflicts. The correlation between low GDP per capita and higher propensities 
for conflicts is one of the more robust empirical relationships in the literature. Collier 
and Hoeffler (1998) argue that increasing income per capita is expected to decrease the 
probability of conflict when economic alternatives for potential rebels evolve and 
improve. An alternative explanation of GDP per capita is proposed by Fearon and Laitin 
(2003). Their point of view is that GDP per capita is a proxy for the state's overall 
                                                 
4 In many cases it is still not clear whether the correlates actually cause conflict or are merely symptoms of 
deeper problems. 
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financial, administrative, police and military capabilities. In other words, the former 
argument suggests the “opportunity cost” theory to explain the relationship between 
income level and risk of conflict, while the latter argument employs the “repressive state 
capacity” as a supplement (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004). Nevertheless, Fearon 
and Laitin also find that per capita income is a robust predictor of civil war. Another 
correlate of conflict is infant mortality rates. Urdal (2005) finds high infant mortality 
rates to be strongly associated with an increased risk of armed conflict onset. Trade is 
proposed as a potential correlate but showed a less consistent relation to conflict 
(Blattman and Miguel, 2010). It is noticeable that conflict and development have dual 
effects. Besides the costs of conflict on development, leading academics (see Sachs, 
2005; for example) have also advocated for poverty reduction and socio-economic 
development in order to reduce violent conflict. 
Foreign aid is the least well-discussed correlate of conflicts. Does foreign aid 
really help the developing countries? Sachs (2005) argues that 0.7% of the GNP of rich 
countries would be enough to eliminate hunger and endemic disease if devoted to the 
poor of the world.5 According to Sachs, with appropriate allocation of the increased aid 
resources, extreme global poverty of under a dollar per day could be eliminated by 2025. 
Pessimistic economists suggest that reformation and execution of aid is futile and 
corrupted. For example, Easterly (2006) states that the chief reason for lack of 
development progress in modern times is not the lack of aid; instead, he argues it is non-
                                                 
5 The world’s richest countries provided just 0.33% of their GNP in official development assistance 
(ODA) in 2005. And the ODA has been declined in the recent years due to financial crisis.  
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democratic governance and corrupt politics and administration in countries receiving this 
aid. Through empirical analysis, Burnside and Dollar (2000) discover that aid has a 
positive impact on growth in those developing countries having good fiscal, monetary 
and trade policies, while in the presence of poor policies, aid has no positive effect on 
growth. Svensson (2000) and Easterly et al. (2004) find no evidence that foreign aid 
brings development. Ree and Nillesen (2009) offer the logic that aid donated to 
developing countries will help those countries to improve their economic conditions, 
which in turn impacts upon conflict. That is to say, foreign assistance indirectly reduces 
conflicts, by directly increasing economic development. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we discuss the 
data set, variable selection and some important observations from the data, and in 
Section 4.3 we discuss the estimation strategy. Section 4.4 presents our results. Section 
4.5 concludes. 
 
4.2 Data 
Data is collected from 79 developing countries over 1995-2010. Due to lack of 
statistical data, Small Island developing countries and developing countries whose 
populations are smaller than 500,000 are excluded from the sample6. The 79-country 
sample is quite representative for the continental developing countries. 
                                                 
6 According to World Bank, there are totally 152 developing countries in the world. We dropped 46 Small 
Island developing countries and 5 developing countries that have populations no greater than 500,000. 
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Appropriately choosing conflict variables for the empirical exercise is important. 
Although we follow previous researchers using the Uppsala University Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP) database (Gleditsch et al., 2002), we choose different measures of 
conflicts. UCDP defines armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at 
least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” UCDP 
has two measurements of conflict events based on its definition of conflict. UCDP firstly 
records the number of battle-related deaths for each country-year; then a secondary 
measurement is created, called “conflict intensity”. Conflict intensity is measured by 
grades on a scale based on the number of battle-related deaths, with higher grade 
indicating more intensive conflict events7. The discrete scale measurement of conflict 
has been popular in the previous studies because of its fitness for econometric models 
for categorical dependent variables (Ree and Nillesen，2009; Collier and Hoeffler，
2002; Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti，2004; Fearon and Laitin，2003). For instance, 
one can set up a threshold such as 1,000 battle-related deaths8. If the number of battle-
related deaths passes the threshold, then it is regarded as “Conflict Onset”, while conflict 
fatalities below the threshold is regarded as “Conflict Ending”. In our empirical analysis, 
we choose to use the actual number of conflict fatalities, rather than the threshold 
method, for the following reasons. First, the choice of threshold level is subjective. Ree 
                                                 
7 Conflict intensity is measured in the following way.  “0”: battle-related death number is lower than 25 in 
a given year; “1”: between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year; “2”: at least 1,000 battle-
related deaths in a given year. 
8 Lower threshold is battle-related deaths > 25; higher threshold could be battle-related deaths > 1,000. 
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and Nillesen (2009) raised concerns that dynamic analysis using either the Probit Model 
or Linear Probability Model in the previous literature is heavily dependent on the 
definition of conflict onset and duration. Their results can be changed if the threshold of 
conflict onset/duration is changed.  Second, when transforming conflict fatality into 
binary states of conflict, information on volatility of battle-related deaths is missed. For 
instance, if a country’s conflict fatalities drop from 10,000 to 1,000, but the number is 
still higher than the threshold, then the state of conflict intensity remains the same 
despite of the dramatic decline of battle-related deaths. Therefore, we use the number of 
conflict fatalities instead of discrete measurements as the main variable because it 
provides an objective, information preserving and policy-friendly way to analyze 
conflict-related issues. It is also worth mentioning that conflict fatalities do not include 
all war-related deaths (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005). As a result, conflict fatalities are 
better regarded as an empirical measure of the conflict size, rather than the total exact 
loss of conflict. 
International aid data is provided by the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC). Yearly data for each aid receiving country was recorded at constant 
US million dollars. The foreign aid data reflects the combination of loans, grants and 
value of technical co-operation given to developing countries. Grants, loans and credits 
for military purposes are excluded. Previous studies (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Ree 
and Nillesen, 2009; Nielsen et al., 2011) usually employ 
𝐴𝑖𝑑
𝐺𝐷𝑃
 (aid-to-GDP ratio). 
However, this ratio variable ignores population effects and absolute aid changes in the 
long run (Juselius et al., 2013; Lof et al., 2015). Following their suggestions, we choose 
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aid per capita as the variable to avoid the limitations of aid-to-GDP ratio. According to 
the OECD DAC dataset, official development assistance (ODA) includes loans where 
the grant element is at least 25% of the total loans. 
Other primary variables of interest are the following. GDP per capita is 
frequently used as an indicator for wealth level. We used the PPP (purchasing power 
parity) -converted GDP per capita data from the Penn World Table (Version 7.1). 
However, GDP per capita may not reveal the distribution of incomes; for instance, a 
relatively rich country may have a small minority of population that enjoys the economic 
advancement. Thus, we also use infant mortality rate to capture the non-income 
development. We use the World Bank’s measure of the probability per 1,000 that a 
newborn baby will die before reaching age five, in a given geographical area during a 
given year. We also consider an index of country stability from the Center for Systemic 
Peace, because a country’s stability is closely associated with its state capacity to 
manage conflict and sustaining progressive development. The index is called state 
fragility index (SFI), which has a 25-point fragility scale: ranging from 0 “no fragility” 
to 25 “extreme fragility”. SFI is estimated for every country based on effectiveness and 
legitimacy in four performance dimensions: Security, Political, Economic, and Social. In 
order to capture the effects of hunger, we used the food inadequacy (FI) index provided 
by FAO9. FI measures the percentage of the population that is at risk of not covering the 
food requirements associated with normal physical activity. 
                                                 
9 FI data is accessible from FAO Statistics: http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-fs/ess-
fadata/en/#.WTF9HGjys2w. 
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To break down the sample by income levels, we follow the World Bank and 
categorize sampled developing countries according to per capita GDP levels, $4,000 and 
$12,500. Thus, 47 countries having GDP per capita lower than $4,000 are grouped as 
low-income developing countries; 30 countries having GDP per capita between $4,000 
and $12,500 are classified as middle-income developing countries. Another way to 
explore the sample in depth is to subgroup the countries by their exposure to conflict. 
According to United Nations, 29 countries out of the sample are labeled as conflict-
prone countries. It is noticeable that there are 16 middle-income countries in the conflict-
prone group, accounting for more than a half of the conflict-prone countries. Table 4.1 
shows summary statistics for each variable across all sample groups. 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics across All Groups in the Sample 
Variables Overall sample Low-income 
group 
Middle-income 
group 
Conflict-prone 
group 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Conflict 
Fatality 
262 872 363 1,060 118 447 690 1,331 
GDP per 
capita 
3,688 3,300 1,514 996 6,805 2,665 2,239 2,173 
Infant 
Mortality 
79 58 110 52 36 35 104 61 
Fragility 13 5 16 4 10 5 17 5 
Food 
Inadequacy 
29 18 37 17 17 13 40 19 
Foreign Aid 51 63 55 62 43 66 43 68 
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Column (1) and (2) in Table 4.1 present the averages and standard deviations of 
the primary variables of the overall sample. A typical developing country has $3,688 
GDP per capita per year, receives $51 aid per year, has 79 children out of 1,000 die 
before the age of 5, and loses 262 people in conflict per year. The comparison across 
income groups shown in columns (3) – (6) reveals that low-income developing countries 
fall behind the middle income developing countries in every socio-economic index. The 
average middle-income group’s GDP per capita is 4.5 times greater than that of low-
income group, and the comparison ratio for infant mortality is 0.33, the FI ratio is 0.46, 
and the conflict fatality ratio is 0.33. However, people living in low-income countries 
receive only 28% more foreign aid than those living in the middle-income developing 
countries. Column (7) and (8) show the summary statistics for the conflict-prone group 
and, as expected, the average number of conflict fatalities is much higher than any other 
group. We also observe that all socio-economic indices excluding GDP per capita in the 
conflict-prone group are worse than the low-income group, even though the conflict-
prone group includes several middle-income countries. It also shows that conflict-prone 
countries receive less foreign aid than any other groups. We make three key observations 
regarding the data in Table 4.1. First, higher income developing countries appear to have 
overall better living conditions. Second, there is room for better distribution of foreign 
aid according to levels of wealth and conflict exposure Third, countries more prone to 
conflict have lower GDP per capita and suffer from much lower living standards 
compared to the average developing country.  
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In order to demonstrate the basic relationships among these variables, we employ 
3-dimentional bubble charts, which allow us to present 3 variables simultaneously, to 
help visualize key trends among our variables. We at first averaged these variables over 
the time period, then made log transformation on the time-averaged variables. As Figure 
4.1 shows, each bubble represents a developing country in the sample. The larger bubble 
size indicates a higher level of GDP per capita. To classify different income groups, we 
associate 3 contrasting colors with the income levels. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Cross Country 3-Dimentional Bubble Charts 
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Panel A of Figure 4.1 reveals the cross-country correlations among conflict 
fatality, aid, and GDP per capita. The correlation between conflict and aid seems 
unclear. However, if we exclude two outliers, Iraq and Afghanistan, in the right-top 
areas, we find a trend that foreign aid and conflict are negatively related, especially for 
the low-income group. This observation reinforces our findings from Table 4.1 that, 
foreign aid seems to flow around the conflict-affected countries. In panel B of Figure 
4.1, it is evident that countries with higher mortality rates receive more foreign aid. The 
exceptions located at the right-bottom corner are Georgia, Lebanon, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which are hot spots in terms of geopolitical interests and therefore receives 
substantial amount of aid. Another exception in the left-top corner is Iran that has a high 
infant mortality rate but does not receive significant international assistance during our 
sample period. Figure 4.1 panel C clearly shows a trend that more fragile countries 
receive more aid. The two outliers on the left-top area are Iran and India. Similarly, we 
find that countries with higher food inadequacy rates tend to receive more foreign aid in 
panel D of Figure 4.1. The exception on the left-top corner is Iran; while the other two 
exceptions located at the right-bottom corner are Lebanon, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Figure 4.1 provides some information on the apparent correlation among the 
variables of interest in the paper, but it is not enough to make conclusions about 
contemporaneous or dynamic causalities. Given the trends shown in Figure 4.1, we 
expect these variables to play important roles in analyzing the causes and effects among 
conflict, development, and foreign aid. 
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4.3 Empirical Methods 
We use a panel vector auto-regressive (panel VAR) model to investigate the 
dynamic interdependence among conflict, development, and foreign aid. Their 
contemporaneous (instantaneous) causal directions are explored using methods from 
machine learning. The results are directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) summary of the 
relationships among innovations from the panel VAR. 
  The primary econometric model takes the following unrestricted reduced form 
(Hsiao, 2003): 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 =  𝛤1𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛤2𝑋𝑖,𝑡−2 +  ⋯ +  𝛤𝑝𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜇𝑖 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                  (4.1) 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a six-variable vector {𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡, 𝐺𝐷𝑃, 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡, 𝑆𝐹𝐼, 𝐹𝐼, 𝐴𝑖𝑑}; 
𝛤1, 𝛤2 … 𝛤𝑝 indicate the lag operator, where the optimal lag length p is determined by 
Schwarz's information criterion (SBC)10; 𝜇𝑖 is a vector of unobserved fixed effects, 
representing country-specific characteristics in our model; 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a vector of  
idiosyncratic errors. 
Panel VAR model has been widely used in applied macroeconomics. As a 
combination of the time-series VAR approach and panel data estimation techniques, the 
panel VAR has several advantages in analyzing the dynamic relationships among 
variables in the system. For instance, as Sambanis (2002) mentioned, endogeneity is one 
of the major problems in conflict-related research. Previously researchers attempted to 
overcome endogeneity by adding lagged variables in the structural model, which has 
                                                 
10 The optimal lag length p=3. The detailed SBC calculation is provided in the appendix. 
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underlying assumption that left-hand-side variable is caused by the right-hand-side 
variables. Yet, the presumed direction of causality in a structural model remains 
contested (Pearl, 2009). Miguel et al. (2004) dealt with endogeneity problems by 
employing rainfall as the instrumental variable (IV) to study conflicts in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In our study, we use the lagged variables as IV and estimate the coefficients by 
system generalized method moments (GMM). Panel VAR simultaneously models all the 
variables in the system as endogenous. Moreover, the dynamic relationships among the 
variables are captured by orthogonalized impulse response functions (IRFs), which is a 
data-driven tool derived from panel VAR model. IRFs describe the dynamic response of 
one variable to a one standard deviation shock in another variable, while holding the 
other variables constant. 
As it is well known that, the variables in the panel VAR model ought to be 
stationary. We employed the second-generation panel unit root test to investigate 
stationarity. Compared with the first-generation tests, the second-generation tests relax 
the assumption of cross-sectional independence across different panel units. In fact, we 
argue that cross-sectional dependence exists in this empirical study due to spatial 
dependence, which is a result of globalization. Furthermore, we made a test for the 
presence of cross-sectional dependence in panel data, which is developed by Hoyos and 
Sarafidis (2006). This test performs well in panel data that is characterized by large N 
(cross section units) and small T (time periods). And the test results reject the null 
hypothesis of cross-sectional independence. We then could implement the second-
generation panel unit root test. Pesaran (2007) proposed the cross-sectional augmented 
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Dickey-Fuller (CADF) test, with the null hypothesis of the presence of unit root. The 
CADF test combined the classical augmented Dickey-Fuller with the approximately 
lagged cross-sectional mean and its first difference in order to capture the cross-sectional 
dependence. The results of CADF test are reported in Table 4.2. For variables in level, 
we find that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for all variables except for FI; for 
variables in first difference, the results show that the null hypothesis could be rejected at 
acceptable level of significance. Therefore, we conclude from Table 4.2 that, the 
variables are non-stationary in level but stationary in first difference. 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 CADF Panel Unit Root Test Results 
Variables Value P-Value 
Conflict 16.67 1.00 
Mort 7.22 1.00 
GDP -0.922 0.18 
SFI 2.99 0.98 
FI -2.23 0.01 
Aid 1.86 0.97 
Δ Conflict -4.44 0.01 
Δ Mort -2.05 0.1 
Δ GDP -2.17 0.08 
Δ SFI -3.36 0.01 
Δ FI -2.52 0.01 
Δ Aid -3.49 0.01 
 
 
 
However, it has been noted that the standard first-differencing procedure results 
in biased coefficients while eliminating fixed effects in Eq. (4.1). Blundell and Bond 
(1998) showed that the first-differenced estimates tend to be overestimated, since fixed 
effects are correlated with the explanatory variables due to the dynamic panel data 
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setting. An alternative to the first-differencing procedure is the following orthogonal 
deviations (Arellano and Bover, 1995): 
𝑋𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝛿𝑡 [𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 
1
𝑇 − 𝑡
 (𝑋𝑖,𝑡+1 +  ⋯ + 𝑋𝑖𝑇)] ,      𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 − 1,                               (4.2)  
and 
𝑒𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝛿𝑡 [𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 
1
𝑇 − 𝑡
 (𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 +  ⋯ +  𝑒𝑖𝑇)] ,      𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 − 1,       𝑦                        (4.3)  
where 𝛿𝑡 =  √(𝑇 − 𝑡) (𝑇 − 𝑡 + 1)⁄  . That is, variables in each of the first (T-1) periods 
are transformed into deviations from their forward means. The weighting 𝛿𝑡  ensures 
equalized variance and preserves orthogonality in the transformed model. The final panel 
VAR model is then: 
𝑋𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛤1𝑋 𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ +  𝛤2𝑋𝑖,𝑡−2
∗ +  ⋯ +  𝛤𝑝𝑋𝑡−𝑝
∗ +  𝑒𝑖𝑡
∗                                                                 (4.4)  
  Our objective is to investigate the dynamic interdependence among variables, 
that is, how one variable of interest reacts to a one-time shock in another variable, while 
holding all other shocks constant. The approach we applied to orthogonalize shocks is 
the Cholesky Decomposition, which places some restrictions on variables ordering. It 
requires variables that come earlier in the ordering should be weakly exogenous with 
respect to the variables that appear later. For instance, if variable A is listed earlier than 
variable B, then A would affect B contemporaneously, but not vice versa. However, 
variables’ lagged impacts are not restricted by Cholesky Decomposition. 
 Often researchers rely on previous literature or economic theory to identify the 
contemporaneous causal relationships. Since the literature in the area of conflict and 
development is not well developed, and the opinions are sometimes conflicting, we 
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choose to follow Bessler and Yang (2006) to identify the VAR ordering. The tool we use 
is called DAGs, which reveal qualitative causal directions through the directed graphs 
analysis of the covariance matrix of 𝑒𝑖𝑡
∗  (Pearl, 2009). DAGs could be interpreted as 
nonparametric structural equation models (NPSEM), since they have no assumption 
about the functional form of the causal effects or distribution of the variables (Elwert, 
2013). In a DAG, directed arrows are used to represent contemporaneous causal flows. If 
variables are not connected by arrows, then it implies that there is no direct 
contemporaneous causal effect. Our data is non-Gaussian. Thus, the LiNGAM (Linear, 
Non-Gaussian, Acyclic causal Models) algorithm developed by Shimizu et al. (2006) is 
applied here to obtain DAGs. The LiNGAM algorithm is based on independent 
component analysis (ICA), which is only feasible for non-Gaussian data. Once we find 
the contemporaneous causal order among variables, we are able to compute IRFs. 
 
4.4 Empirical Results 
 As explained in the above section, DAGs recover the exogeneity for each 
variable in order to guide the Cholesky Decomposition in IRF computation. Figure 4.2 
demonstrates the contemporaneous causal directions of the overall sample. It shows that 
foreign aid is not correlated with the others in the contemporary period. We also observe 
that GDP per capita and conflict fatality are the consequences, while infant mortality, 
SFI and FI are the causes in the contemporary period. This finding is repeated by the 
other DAG causality charts of other subgroups, which are placed in the appendix to save 
space. 
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Figure 4.2 DAG Contemporaneous Causality Chart for the Overall Sample 
 
 
 
When it comes to the dynamic relationship, it is of great interest to investigate 
the effects of foreign aid on reducing conflict. Figure 4.3 shows the dynamic response of 
conflict fatality to a foreign aid shock. The different panels in this figure provide IRFs 
based on different sample groups. Panel A of Figure 4.3 shows that a positive standard 
deviation shock to foreign aid per capita (which corresponds to a $3 increase of aid per 
capita with respect to its baseline) surprisingly leads to an escalation of conflict for all 
sampled developing countries, although the rising trend of conflict is not statistically 
significant. The next two panels in Figure 4.3 show similar IRFs for the conflict-prone 
group and the low-income group. The impact of a shock to foreign aid on conflict 
becomes significant in the first year for the low-income group, as it suggests in Panel C. 
However, the effects of foreign aid shock on conflict fatality change drastically for the 
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middle-income group, as shown in Panel D. Comparing panels B, C and D, it appears 
that aid will only be able to reduce conflict in countries which have better economic 
infrastructure (either indicating higher opportunity cost for rebels or greater repressive 
capacity of the government); and for poorer or conflict prone economies an aid shock 
will even exacerbate conflict, although such amplifying effects are not statistically 
significant. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Impulse-Response Functions of Conflict Fatality to Foreign Aid 
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 On the other hand, how does foreign aid respond to the changes of conflict? The 
dynamic response of foreign aid to a one positive standard deviation shock in conflict 
fatality is depicted in Figure 4.4. As is shown in Panel A, given a conflict fatality shock 
(which corresponds to an increased number of battle-related deaths by 5), the aid per 
capita received by a typical developing country is not significant at any period except for 
the second year. One possible explanation for such lagged response pattern is that most 
of the aid agencies make the country-specific aid decision every other year. Even the 
intensification of a conflict is taken into consideration by the aid agencies; their 
bureaucratic characteristics make them go through many steps to take an action 
(Easterly, 2002). At the second year, the amount of foreign aid per capita reaches the 
peak with the magnitude of $10, which implies that the distribution of foreign aid is 
quite sensitive to the escalation of conflict. The next two panels express similar reactions 
of foreign aid to conflict shock for the conflict-prone group and the low-income group. 
Panel D displays the IRF for the middle-income group, exhibiting that the distribution of 
foreign aid among middle-income developing countries is not sensitive to the sharpen 
conflicts. 
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Figure 4.4 Impulse-Response Functions of Foreign Aid to Conflict Fatality 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 together capture the dynamic relationship between 
foreign aid and conflicts. We find that income levels matter in such analysis. For the 
middle-income developing countries, although increasing foreign aid would lower 
conflict fatality, aid distribution is not very sensitive to the degree of conflict. For the 
low-income and conflict-prone countries, aid delivery is responsive to the degree of 
conflict in a two-year lag, but the outcome of increasing foreign aid turns out to be weak. 
In this part, we examine the dynamic feedback effects between foreign aid and 
development, while holding all other shocks equal to zero. We note from Figure 4.5 that 
foreign aid in the conflict-prone and low-income countries is lagged responsive to a one 
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standard deviation shock in GDP per capita. Panel B and C of Figure 4.5 show 
significant negative effects of GDP shock on foreign aid for the conflict-prone and low-
income developing countries. Coincidently, the significant turning point of foreign aid 
happens at the second year after a GDP shock, which exhibits the same reaction pattern 
of foreign aid to conflict, as is shown in Figure 4.4. Comparing Figure 4.5 and Figure 
4.6 it seems that the distribution of foreign aid relies heavily on the conditions of income 
development rather than non-income development. Moreover, there is large room for 
improving the reaction rate of foreign aid. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Impulse-Response Functions of Foreign Aid per capita to GDP per capita 
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Figure 4.6 Impulse-Response Functions of Foreign Aid per capita to Infant Mortality  
 
 
 
Another well-discussed debate is whether foreign aid really benefits the 
recipients in terms of development. The IRF results also contribute to this issue. Figure 
4.7 shows that foreign aid shock to GDP is only positive for the low-income developing 
countries. Quantitatively, the level of GDP per capita will be increased by $9 with 
respect to an increase of foreign aid per capita by $3.3. Also, Figure 4.8 shows that 
infant mortality rates in the conflict-prone and low-income groups negatively respond to 
the shock in foreign aid. Regarding the middle-income developing countries, the effects 
of aid on either GDP or infant mortality rate are not significant. Therefore, an increase in 
 91 
 
foreign aid is shown to be very useful in enhancing the development of the poor and 
conflict-prone countries. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Impulse-Response Functions of GDP per capita to Foreign Aid per capita 
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Figure 4.8 Impulse-Response Functions of Infant Mortality Rate to Foreign Aid per 
capita 
 
 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
The main purpose of this study is to illustrate how foreign aid interacts with the 
levels of development and conflict in dynamic patterns. By employing panel VAR model 
and directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), we are able to demonstrate how a shock (increase) 
to one variable results in the responding changes of another variable. It shows that the 
dynamic interdependences among aid, development, and conflict are largely dependent 
on economic and political contexts. The analysis was conducted using information on 79 
nations’ relative wealth and conflict proneness over the period 1995-2010. Hence, we 
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divided the overall sample into three sub-clusters: low income countries, middle income 
countries, and conflict prone countries. 
The most important findings of our study are that, foreign aid only appears to 
reduce conflict in middle income developing countries with relatively higher income 
level; but foreign aid performs well in enhancing the development of the poor and 
conflict-prone countries. In addition, we find that foreign aid is responsive to 
development or conflict shock in a two-year lag. We argue that foreign assistance 
policies of donors are reactive rather than proactive. The results of this study contribute 
to neo classical political thought and have policy ramifications. 
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CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The objective of this chapter is to summarize the research questions and 
empirical results of this study. The main purpose of study is to investigate the 
importance of historic legacy, geography, as well as external assistance shocks on the 
likelihood of current civil conflicts. Chapter II and III focus on the prevalence of civil 
conflict in SSA. Chapter IV expands the sample towards to the global developing 
countries. 
Slave trade during 1400-1900 is one the most influential historic event in Africa. 
Chapter II explores the long-run effects of slave trade on current conflict in SSA.  One of 
the contributions to the literature is that we disaggregate the country level data into 
hundreds of micro level regions. The first important result is that the more slaves it 
exported, the more likely a region is prone to civil conflict in the contemporary era. 
Furthermore, IV approach is employed to confirm that this relationship is causal. Taking 
advantage of African survey data and geographic information system technique, I also 
uncover the possible channels through which slave trade affects current conflict. The 
channels can be categorized into two ways: economic development and non-economic 
factors. In terms of the non-economic factors, ethnic identities, mistrust, and local 
institutions appear to be the main channels. I argue that the procurement and trade of 
slaves lead to mistrust among individuals, weakened local governance and stronger 
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ethnic identity rather than national identity, which in turn increases the likelihood of 
civil conflict incidence. 
Chapter III addresses the question that whether the geography (climate-war) 
hypothesis holds for the African countries. By constructing the unique agriculture-
relevant weather shock indicators at the grid level, I show that weather shock occurred 
during the crop growing season are strongly associated with the risk of conflict 
incidence, onset, and intensity. The results provide evidence that weather variability 
affects the prevalence of civil conflict through agricultural production shock. 
Another interesting research question considered in Chapter III is that if the 
climate-war relationship holds, will it affect the slave trade-war relationship. Proponents 
of the geography view stress the importance of geographic factors, such as climate, 
natural resources, and the disease environment in determining the current development 
and conflict. Although previous studies argue that history also matters in affecting the 
current economic outcomes, it shows that history influences current economic 
development through the channels for geographic characteristics. The results from the 
interaction analysis show that the exposure to the slave trade amplifies the impact of 
weather shock on contemporaneous conflict risk. It implies the uncovered mechanisms 
that history and geography can jointly affect the current likelihood of civil conflict 
events. In other words, the exposure to the slave trade can be regarded as a “weather 
shock multiplier”. 
Chapter IV attempts to answer the following two research questions: Can foreign 
aid reduce poverty? Or can foreign aid mitigate civil conflict? It is assumed that there is 
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no one-size-fits all answer. Thus, I breakdown the sample countries by their wealth 
levels and conflict proneness. Both contemporaneous and dynamic relationships among 
foreign aid, development, and conflict are studied in this chapter. One outcome is that 
foreign aid is responsive to economic or conflict shock in a two-year lag. Another 
outcome is that the effects of foreign aid are sensitive to the countries' economic and 
political contexts. On one hand, foreign aid reduces conflict intensity only in the middle-
income developing countries that have relatively higher income level and better 
economic infrastructure. On the other hand, foreign aid performs well in improving the 
economic and human development for the low-income and conflict-prone countries. 
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